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Abstract
In this work we study the secrecy capacity of Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels
(WTCs) with a finite memory, subject to a per-symbol average power constraint on the MIMO channel input. MIMO
channels with finite memory are very common in wireless communications as well as in wireline communications
(e.g., in communications over power lines). To derive the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite
memory we first construct an asymptotically-equivalent block-memoryless MIMO WTC, which is then transformed
into a set of parallel, independent, memoryless MIMO WTCs in the frequency domain. The secrecy capacity of the
Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite memory is obtained as the secrecy capacity of the set of parallel independent
memoryless MIMO WTCs, and is expressed as a maximization over the input covariance matrices in the frequency
domain. Lastly, we detail two applications of our result: First, we show that the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian
scalar WTC with finite memory can be achieved by waterfilling, and obtain a closed-form expression for this secrecy
capacity. Then, we use our result to characterize the secrecy capacity of narrowband powerline channels, thereby
resolving one of the major open issues for this channel model.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, MIMO channels, channels with memory, wiretap channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main challenges in the design of communications schemes for shared channels is to reliably transmit
information to a destination, while keeping potential eavesdroppers ignorant of the transmitted information. The
fundamental model for studying secure physical-layer communications over shared mediums is the wiretap channel
(WTC) model [1], which consists of three terminals: A transmitter (Tx), an intended receiver (Rx), and an eaves-
dropper (Ev). The secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum information rate for reliable Tx–Rx communications
such that the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper asymptotically vanishes. The initial study of WTCs
detailed in [1], considered memoryless WTCs in which the channel inputs and the channel outputs are discrete
random variables (RVs) with finite alphabets, and the Tx–Ev channel is a physically degraded version of the Tx–Rx
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channel. The general discrete memoryless WTC was studied in [2], which characterized its secrecy capacity by
introducing a virtual channel, also referred to as prefix channel [3, Ch. 3.5].
Memoryless scalar WTCs with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) were first studied in [4], which made three
important observations: (1) No prefix channel is required, (2) Gaussian codebooks are optimal, and (3) The secrecy
capacity is zero when the noise power at the intended receiver is equal to or greater than the noise power at the
eavesdropper. Several works studied the fundamental limits of secure communications over memoryless WTCs with
AWGN and multiple antennas at the terminals, referred to as the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) WTC: The
work [5] considered the scenario of two antennas at the Tx, two antennas at the Rx, and one antenna at the Ev, where
the channel input is subject to a per-codeword average power constraint. The secrecy capacity of MIMO WTCs with
an arbitrary number of antennas at each node was derived in [6] subject to a per-codeword average power constraint,
and in [7] subject to a per-symbol average power constraint. An alternative derivation of the secrecy capacity of
MIMO WTCs was carried out in [8], subject to a more general input covariance matrix constraint. In [8, Corollary
1] it is shown that the secrecy capacity subject to a per-codeword average power constraint on the input can be
obtained as a corollary of the main result of [8]. The more general scenario of AWGN MIMO broadcast channels
with confidential messages was studied in [9]–[11]. Similarly to the scalar Gaussian case, the secrecy capacity
of MIMO WTCs with AWGN is achieved by using a Gaussian codebook without channel prefixing, where the
secrecy capacity expression is stated as an optimization over all possible input covariance matrices which satisfy a
specified power constraint. This optimization problem was shown to be non-convex [6], [12]–[14], and methods for
approaching the maximizing input covariance matrix were proposed in several works. In particular, [12] proposed
an algorithm based on alternating optimization for approaching the optimal covariance matrix, [13] studied the
conditions for the covariance matrix to be full rank and characterized the optimal covariance matrix for this case,
and in [14] rank deficient solutions for the optimal covariance matrix were proposed. Secrecy in the presence of
temporally correlated Gaussian noise was studied in [15], which considered scalar degraded block-memoryless
WTCs with additive colored Gaussian noise. Additional scenarios of physical-layer security in modern networks
include fading WTCs, studied in [16]–[18], independent parallel channels, studied in [19], [20], and an achievable
secrecy rate for multi-carrier systems, characterized in [21] and [22]. The wiretap framework was further extended
to multi-user channels in [23]–[26] (see also detailed surveys in [27], [3, Ch. 8], and [28, Ch. 22]). The secrecy
capacity of arbitrary wiretap channels was studied in [29], yet, the expression derived in [29, Thm. 1] is rather
involved and does not identify the input distribution which maximizes the secrecy rate. Finally, we note that a
suboptimal precoding scheme for block frequency-selective scalar WTCs with AWGN was proposed in [30].
In this paper we study the secrecy capacity of MIMO Gaussian WTCs with finite memory, i.e., MIMO Gaussian
WTCs in which the channel introduces intersymbol interference (ISI) of a finite duration at each receive antenna,
and the noise is an additive stationary colored Gaussian process whose temporal correlation has a finite length.
This channel model applies to many communications scenarios, including wireless communications and power
line communications. However, despite the importance of this model as a fundamental model for secure modern
communications, the secrecy capacity of Gaussian finite-memory MIMO WTCs and also of Gaussian finite-memory
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scalar WTCs has not been characterized to date.
Main Contributions: In this paper we derive the secrecy capacity of Gaussian MIMO WTCs with finite memory,
subject to a per-MIMO symbol average power constraint on the channel input, where the transmitter knows both the
Tx-Rx channel and the Tx-Ev channel. To this aim, we first construct a block-memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTC
based on the characteristics of the original finite-memory Gaussian MIMO WTC, and prove that the two channel
models are asymptotically equivalent. Then, we transform the block-memoryless channel into an equivalent set of
parallel memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTCs, for which the secrecy capacity has been characterized in [19]. Our
derivation uses concepts from the derivation of the (non-secure) capacity of finite-memory Gaussian point-to-point
channels [31], multiple-access channels (MACs) [32], and broadcast channels (BCs) [33], as well as introduce novel
techniques and schemes for the analysis of the information leakage rate at the eavesdropper. For the special case of
the scalar Gaussian WTC with finite memory, we show that the secrecy capacity can be obtained via the waterfilling
power allocation scheme, and demonstrate the resulting rate via a numerical example. Finally, we show how our
result directly leads to the secrecy capacity of narrowband powerline communications (PLC) channels, which is
a major challenge in smart grid communications networks [34]. Our results provide insights on the relationship
between these seemingly different problems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the problem formulation; Section III derives
the secrecy capacity for finite-memory Gaussian MIMO WTCs; Section IV discusses the results and their application
to PLC, and provides a numerical example; Lastly, Section V provides some concluding remarks.
II. NOTATIONS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Notations
We use upper-case letters to denote random variables (RVs), e.g., X , and calligraphic letters to denote sets, e.g.,
X . We denote column vectors with boldface letters, e.g., X; the k-th element of a vector X (k ≥ 0) is denoted
with (X)k . Matrices are denoted with Sans-Sarif fonts, e.g., M; the element at the k-th row and the l-th column of
a matrix M is denoted by (M)k,l. We use Ia to denote the a × a identity matrix, and 0a×b to denote the all-zero
a× b matrix. Hermitian transpose, transpose, trace, complex conjugate, and stochastic expectation are denoted by
(·)H , (·)T , Tr(·), (·)∗, and E{·}, respectively. We use I(X ;Y ) to denote the mutual information between the RVs
X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y , H(X) to denote the entropy of a discrete RV X , h(X) to denote the differential entropy of a
continuous RV X , and p(X) to denote the probability density function (PDF) of a continuous RV X . The symbol
d
= denotes equality in distribution, and we use j to denote
√−1; All logarithms are taken to base 2. The sets of
integers, non-negative integers, real numbers, and complex numbers are denoted by Z, N, R, and C, respectively.
We use ((a))b to denote “a modulo b”, i.e., writing c = ((a))b implies that c is satisfies the relationship a = k ·b+c,
where k ∈ Z and 0 ≤ c < b. We use a+ to denote max {0, a}, and |·| to denote the magnitude when applied
to scalars, and the determinant operator when applied to matrices. For x ∈ R, ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer not
greater than x.
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For any sequence, possibly multivariate, q[i], i ∈ Z, and for any pair of integers, a1, a2, satisfying a1 < a2, we
use qa2a1 to denote the column vector obtained by stacking
[
q[a1]
T ,q[a1 + 1]
T . . . ,q[a2]
T
]T
and define qa2 ≡ qa20 .
Lastly, we define the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a real multivariate sequence as follows: For some nq ∈ N,
let {qˆ[k]}n−1k=0 denote the n-point DFT of the multivariate sequence {q[i]}n−1i=0 , q[i] ∈ Rnq . The sequence {qˆ[k]}n−1k=0
is computed via
qˆ[k] =
n−1∑
i=0
q[i]e−j2π
ik
n , (1)
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} , N .
B. Channel Model
We consider the nt× nr × ne MIMO WTC with finite memory. Let m be a non-negative integer which denotes
the length of the memory of the channel, and let W[i] ∈ Rnr and U[i] ∈ Rne be two multivariate, zero-mean
stationary real Gaussian processes with autocorrelation functions CW [τ ] , E
{
W[i+ τ ](W[i])T
}
and CU [τ ] ,
E
{
U[i + τ ](U[i])
T
}
, respectively. We assume that W [i1] and U [i2] are uncorrelated ∀i1, i2 ∈ Z, and that
CW [τ ] = 0nr×nr and CU [τ ] = 0ne×ne for all |τ | > m. We further assume that none of the samples of W[i] and
U[i] are deterministically dependent, i.e., there is no index i0 for which either W[i0] or U[i0] can be expressed as
a linear combination of {W[i]}i6=i0 and {U[i]}i6=i0 , respectively. Let {H[τ ]}
m
τ=0 denote the real nr × nt Tx–Rx
channel transfer matrices and {G[τ ]}mτ=0 denote the real ne × nt Tx–Ev channel transfer matrices. The channel
transfer matrices, {H[τ ]}mτ=0 and {G[τ ]}mτ=0, and the autocorrelation functions of the noises, CW [τ ] and CW [τ ],
τ ∈ Z, are assumed to be a-priori known at the transmitter. We refer to this assumption as Tx-CSI. The input-output
relationships for the linear time-invariant (LTI) Gaussian MIMO WTC (LGMWTC) are given by
Y[i] =
m∑
τ=0
H[τ ]X[i − τ ] +W[i] (2a)
Z[i] =
m∑
τ=0
G[τ ]X[i − τ ] +U[i], (2b)
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l−1}, l ∈ N, where the channel inputs are subject to a per-MIMO symbol power constraint (hereafter
referred to as per-symbol power constraint for brevity)
E
{
‖X [i]‖2
}
≤ P, (3)
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l− 1}. We note that restricting the power of the information symbols at all time instants, rather than
over the entire codeword, is very common in the design of practical communications systems, since the dynamic
range of practical power amplifiers is limited [35, Ch. 09], rendering it impossible for transmitters to ”store” power
for later channel uses. This constraint is therefore a natural model for energy-constrained channels [31, Sec. I-A]. It
should also be noted that similar constraints were used in related works, e.g., the derivation of the secrecy capacity
of memoryless MIMO channels in [7], as well as in the derivation of some major information theoretic results
including [31], [36, Section VII], and [37].
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In this work we characterize the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC.
C. Definitions
The framework used in this study is based on the following definitions:
Definition 1. A MIMO WTC with memory, in which the transmitter has nt antennas, the intended receiver has
nr antennas, and the eavesdropper has ne antennas, abbreviated as the nt × nr × ne MIMO WTC, consists of
an input stream X[i] ∈ Rnt , two output streams Y[i] ∈ Rnr and Z[i] ∈ Rne , observed by the intended receiver
and by the eavesdropper, respectively, i ∈ N, an initial state S0 ∈ S0, and a sequence of transition probabilities{
p
(
Yl−1,Zl−1|Xl−1,S0
)}∞
l=1
.
In this work we focus on the LGMWTC, which is an instance of the general class of MIMO WTCs with memory
defined above. From Def. 1 it follows that the initial state of the LGMWTC is given by
S0 =
[(
X−1−m
)T
,
(
W−1−m
)T
,
(
U−1−m
)T ]T
.
Note that complex MIMO WTCs with memory can be accommodated by the setup of Def. 1 by representing all
complex vectors using real vectors having twice the number of elements and, representing the complex channel
matrices using real matrices having four times the number of elements, corresponding to the real parts and the
imaginary parts of the entries, see, e.g., [37, Sec. I].
Definition 2. An [R, l] code with rate R and blocklength l ∈ N for the WTC consists of: (1) A source of local
randomness at the encoder represented by the RV D ∈ D with PDF p(D). (2) An encoder el which maps a message
M , uniformly distributed over M , {0, 1, . . . , 2lR − 1}, and a realization of D into a codeword Xl−1 ∈ X l, i.e.,
el :M×D 7→ X l.
(3) A decoder dl which maps the channel output Yl−1 ∈ Y l into a message Mˆ ∈ M. i.e.,
dl : Y l 7→ M.
The source of local randomness D facilitates the random nature of the encoder, and it is emphasized that the
realization of D is known only to the encoder.
Note that we follow the standard setup for channels with memory and let the encoder and decoder operate using
only the l symbols corresponding to the currently transmitted codeword [31]–[33], [38, Ch. 5.9], [39]. The encoder
is assumed to be independent of the initial state S0.
Definition 3. The average probability of error of an [R, l] code, when the initial state is s0, is defined as:
P le (s0) =
1
2lR
2lR−1∑
m˜=0
Pr
(
dl
(
Yl−1
) 6= m˜∣∣M = m˜,S0 = s0) .
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Definition 4. A secrecy rate Rs is achievable for a WTC if for every positive triplet ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 > 0, ∃l0 > 0 such
that ∀l > l0 there exists an [R, l] code which satisfies:
sup
s0∈S0
P le (s0) ≤ ǫ1, (4a)
sup
s0∈S0
1
l
I
(
M ;Zl−1
∣∣S0 = s0) ≤ ǫ2, (4b)
and
R ≥ Rs − ǫ3. (4c)
Def. 4 extends the definition of codes for memoryless WTCs stated in [3, Ch. 3.5], [28, Ch. 22.1] to finite-memory
WTCs. The term 1
l
I
(
M ;Zl−1
∣∣S0 = s0) represents the maximum achievable information rate at the eavesdropper,
while the eavesdropper knows the initial state. This achievable rate is referred to as the information leakage rate
[3, Ch. 3.4].
Definition 5. The secrecy capacity is defined as the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates.
Definition 6. A WTC is said to be memoryless if for every non-negative integer i
p
(
Y[i],Z[i]|Yi−1,Zi−1,Xi,S0
)
= p (Y[i],Z[i]|X[i]) .
Def. 6 corresponds to the general notion of memoryless channels as in, e.g., [41, Sec. II-A]. Note that if there
is no feedback to the transmitter, it follows that p
(
X[i]
∣∣Xi−1,Yi−1,Zi−1,S0) = p (X[i]∣∣Xi−1). Then, Def. 6
implies that for every positive integer l,
p
(
Yl−1,Zl−1|Xl−1,S0
)
=
l−1∏
i=0
p
(
Y[i],Z[i]
∣∣∣X[i]) , (5)
which also coincides with the definition of memoryless WTCs stated in [3, Ch. 3.5]. We henceforth assume that
no feedback is present in any of the channels considered.
Definition 7. A WTC is said to be n-block memoryless if for every positive integer b
p
(
Yn·b−1,Zn·b−1|Xn·b−1,S0
)
=
b∏
b˜=1
p
(
Yn·b˜−1
n·(b˜−1)
,Zn·b˜−1
n·(b˜−1)
|Xn·b˜−1
n·(b˜−1)
)
.
Def. 7 corresponds to the definition of n-block memoryless BCs stated in [33, Eq. (8)]. Note that codewords of
any length can be transmitted over n-block memoryless channels, however, when the length of the codeword is an
integer multiple of the channel block memory n, then the average probability of error is independent of the initial
state S0 [33, Sec. II], and similarly, the information leakage rate is also independent of S0. This follows since
the outputs of the channels at the receiver and at the eavesdropper corresponding to the transmitted codeword are
independent of the initial channel state, by the definition of the channel.
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III. THE SECRECY CAPACITY OF THE LGMWTC
Our main result is the characterization of the secrecy capacity of the LTI Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite
memory, defined in Subsection II-B. This secrecy capacity is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Consider the LGMWTC defined in (2) subject to the per-symbol power constraint (3) and with Tx-
CSI. Define C′
W
(ω) ,
m∑
τ=−m
CW [τ ] e
−jωτ
, C′
U
(ω) ,
m∑
τ=−m
CU [τ ] e
−jωτ
, H′(ω) ,
m∑
τ=0
H [τ ] e−jωτ , and G′(ω) ,
m∑
τ=0
G [τ ] e−jωτ . Let CP denote the set of nt × nt positive semi-definite Hermitian matrix functions C′X(ω), defined
over the interval ω ∈ [0, π), such that
1
π
π∫
ω=0
Tr
(
C′X(ω)
)
dω ≤ P, (6a)
and define ψ(ω) as:
ψ(ω),
∣∣∣Inr+H′(ω)C′X(ω) (H′(ω))H(C′W(ω) )−1∣∣∣∣∣∣Ine+G′(ω)C′X(ω) (G′(ω))H(C′U(ω) )−1∣∣∣ . (6b)
Then, the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC is given by
Cs = max
C′
X
(ω)∈CP
1
2π
π∫
ω=0
logψ(ω)dω. (6c)
In the proof we use elements from the capacity derivation for the finite-memory MAC [32] and BC [33], as well
as novel approach and techniques for analyzing the information leakage rate.
Proof Outline: First, for n > 2m, we define the n-block memoryless circular Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel
(n-CGMWTC) as follows: Let
˜
W[i] and
˜
U[i] be zero mean multivariate Gaussian processes, whose autocorrelation
functions, denoted C
˜
W [τ ] and C
˜
U [τ ], respectively, are defined by
C
˜
W [τ ] , CW [τ ] + CW [τ + n] + CW [τ − n] , (7a)
C
˜
U [τ ] , CU [τ ] + CU [τ + n] + CU [τ − n] , (7b)
when the noise samples belong to the same n-block. Noise samples that belong to different n-blocks are independent
since the channel is n-block memoryless. The outputs of the n-CGMWTC over any given n-block, i.e., for i =
0, 1, . . . , n− 1, are defined as
˜
Y[i] =
m∑
τ=0
H[τ ]X [((i− τ))n] + ˜W[i] (8a)
˜
Z[i] =
m∑
τ=0
G[τ ]X [((i− τ))n] + ˜U[i]. (8b)
The n-CGMWTC is subject to the same per-symbol average power constraints as the LGMWTC, stated in (3). Note
that the definition of the n-CGMWTC is a natural extension of the definition of the n-block memoryless circular
Gaussian channel (without secrecy), defined in [33, Sec. II], to secure communications.
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The proof now proceeds in the following steps:
• In Subsection III-A, we prove that the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC can be obtained from the secrecy
capacity of the n-CGMWTC by taking n → ∞. Note that while the asymptotic relationship between finite-
memory channels and their circular block-memoryless counterparts has been used in the (non-secure) capacity
analysis of finite-memory Gaussian channels in, e.g., [31], [32], and [33], to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time this approach is applied in the study of the secrecy capacity, and in such scenarios analyzing
the information leakage presents a substantial challenge, as is evident from the analysis in Appendix A.
• Next, in Subsection III-B, we derive a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC
for a finite n.
• Lastly, in Subsection III-C, we let n → ∞ and use the capacity expression derived for the n-CGMWTC in
Subsection III-B, to obtain an explicit optimization problem whose maximal solution is the secrecy capacity
of the LGMWTC.
A. Equivalence Between the Secrecy Capacity of the LGMWTC and the Asymptotic Secrecy Capacity of the n-
CGMWTC
We now show that the secrecy capacity of the finite-memory LTI Gaussian MIMO WTC can be obtained as
the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC, by taking n → ∞. Letting Cn−CGs denote the secrecy capacity of the
n-CGMWTC, the result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC defined in (2), subject to the power constraint (3) can be
written as
Cs = lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs . (9)
Proof: We provide here an outline of the proof; The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A. First, recall that
the n-CGMWTC is defined for n > 2m. Next, for n > 2m we define the n-block memoryless Gaussian MIMO
wiretap channel (n-MGMWTC) as follows: The n-MGMWTC is obtained from the LGMWTC by considering the
last n−m vector channel outputs out of each n-block at both the eavesdropper and the receiver, i.e., the outputs
of the n-MGMWTC are defined as the outputs of the LGMWTC for 0 ≤ ((i))n ≥ m, while for ((i))n < m the
outputs of the n-MGMWTC are not defined, see, e.g., [40]. The n-MGMWTC is subject to the power constraint
(3) on the channel input, similarly to the LGMWTC. With this definition, we formulate the secrecy capacity of
the n-MGMWTC in the form of the result of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2, Eq. (11)]. Note that since the LGMWTC is
transformed into the n-MGMWTC by setting the first m vector channel outputs out of each n-block of channel
outputs to be “undefined” (see also, e.g., [33, Appendix A]), then by construction the codeword transmission starts
at the beginning of an n-block, i.e., an n-block begins at time i = 0. Next, we show that the secrecy capacity of
the LGMWTC can be obtained as the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC by taking n → ∞. For non-secure
communications over BCs, it immediately follows that the capacity of the n-block memoryless Gaussian BC is
not larger than the capacity of the LTI Gaussian BC, as the n-block memoryless Gaussian BC is a special case of
the LTI Gaussian BC, obtained by letting the intended receiver discard m channel outputs out of every block of n
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received channel outputs, as was already shown in [33, Appendix A]. However, in the secure setup, this no longer
holds, as the decoder at the eavesdropper cannot be forced to discard m vector channel outputs out of every block
of n received channel outputs, and we conclude that such an inequality relationship between the secrecy capacities
of the n-MGMWTC and of the LGMWTC can be proved only for the asymptotic case n → ∞. This presents a
fundamental difference from non-secure scenarios as will be elaborated in Comment A.2 in Appendix A. Lastly,
we show that in the asymptotic regime of n→∞, the n-MGMWTC and the n-CGMWTC have the same secrecy
capacity, from which we conclude that Cs is the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC, in the limit n→∞.
Comment 1. In the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A, the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC is obtained
from the secrecy capacity of a memoryless Gaussian MIMO channel in which the number of antennas is set to be
an integer multiple of n. Consequently, the computation of the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC for n → ∞
becomes prohibitive, and the expression for the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC provides only little insight
on the characterization of the channel inputs that achieve the secrecy capacity. However, the secrecy capacity of
the n-CGMWTC for n→∞ can be obtained as a maximization problem with a closed-form objective, as will be
shown in the sequel. For this reason, the n-MGMWTC is only an intermediate step, and in order to obtain a useful
characterization of Cs we consider the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC.
Comment 2. As the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC is independent of the initial channel state, we conclude
that the secrecy capacity of the finite-memory Gaussian MIMO WTC is also independent of the initial state. This is
intuitive as the finite-memory property of the channel makes the impact of the initial state vanish when considering
very large blocklengths.
Comment 3. The coding scheme that achieves the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC does not require a prefix
channel. In Lemma A.6 it is shown that every achievable rate Rs for the LGMWTC can be approached by applying
codes for the n-MGMWTC which approach the same Rs after adding a fixed number of zero symbols at the
beginning of each codeword. Since in Lemma A.4 it is shown that the coding scheme that achieves the secrecy
capacity for the n-MGMWTC does not require a prefix channel, it follows from this code construction that the
coding scheme that achieves the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC does not require a prefix channel. This conclusion
simplifies the design of secure coding schemes for such channels.
B. Characterizing the Secrecy Capacity of the n-CGMWTC
Next, we derive Cn−CGs for a fixed and finite n > 2m. The derivation begins with applying the DFT to each n-
block of the n-CGMWTC. Let
{
˜
Wˆ[k]
}n−1
k=0
and
{
˜
Uˆ[k]
}n−1
k=0
be the n-point DFTs of {
˜
W[i]}n−1i=0 and {˜U[i]}
n−1
i=0 ,
respectively, i.e.,
˜
Wˆ[k] ,
n−1∑
i=0 ˜
W[i]e−j2π
ik
n and
˜
Uˆ[k] ,
n−1∑
i=0 ˜
U[i]e−j2π
ik
n
. Let C
˜
Wˆ
[k] and C
˜
Uˆ
[k] denote the
covariance matrices of
˜
Wˆ[k] and
˜
Uˆ[k], respectively. Define Hˆ[k] ,
m∑
τ=0
H[τ ]e−j2π
τk
n and Gˆ[k] ,
m∑
τ=0
G[τ ]e−j2π
τk
n
.
The secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC for a fixed and finite n is stated in the following proposition:
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Proposition 2. Let CˆnP denote the collection of n-sets of nt×nt positive semi-definite Hermitian matrices
{
C
Xˆ
[k]
}n−1
k=0
,
which satisfy C
Xˆ
[k] =
(
C
Xˆ
[n− k])∗ for ⌊n2 ⌋ < k < n, and
n−1∑
k=0
Tr
(
C
Xˆ
[k]
) ≤ n2P. (10a)
Further define ψˆ[k] as:
ψˆ[k],
∣∣∣∣Inr+ Hˆ[k]CXˆ [k](Hˆ[k])H (C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ine+ Gˆ[k]CXˆ [k](Gˆ[k])H (C
˜
Uˆ
[k]
)−1∣∣∣∣
. (10b)
The secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC defined in (8), for a fixed and finite n, subject to the per-symbol constraint
(3) is
Cn−CGs = max{CXˆ[k]}n−1k=0∈CˆnP
1
2n
n−1∑
k=0
log ψˆ[k]. (10c)
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix B, and in the following we present only the outline of the
proof: By applying the multivariate DFT to the channel outputs of the n-CGMWTC, we obtain an equivalent set
of n MIMO WTCs in the frequency domain, such that each component WTC has no ISI and has additive Gaussian
noise. We then show that the noise components in the equivalent set of n MIMO WTCs at different frequency
indexes are mutually independent and that each noise component is a circularly symmetric complex normal random
process, i.i.d. across different n-blocks. Next, relaxing the power constraint to the per n-block power constraint,
it follows that the equivalent set of n parallel MIMO WTCs can be analyzed as a set of independent parallel
memoryless MIMO WTCs with additive circularly symmetric complex normal noise, i.i.d. in time (here, we refer
to the frequency index as “time”). The secrecy rate of the component MIMO WTCs for a given power allocation,
has already been established in [6] and [7]. In Prop. 2 we state that the secrecy rate of the equivalent set of n
MIMO WTCs subject to a given power allocation for each subchannel can be written as the sum of the secrecy
rates of the independent subchannels, divided by the number of subchannels. In order to arrive at this expression,
we use an obvious extension of [19, Thm. 1] to the memoryless Gaussian MIMO case. The secrecy capacity for
the equivalent set of n parallel MIMO WTCs is obtained by maximizing over all secrecy rates which satisfy the
relaxed sum-power constraint, eventually resulting in (10). Lastly, we show that the channel input which achieves
the secrecy capacity satisfies the per-symbol average power constraint (3), hence (10) characterizes the secrecy
capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to (3).
C. The Secrecy Capacity of the LGMWTC
In the final step, we first derive the asymptotic expression for Cn−CGs in the limit of n→∞. Then, we obtain
Cs as the limit lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs . The asymptotic expression for lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs is stated in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs converges to the expression in (6).
10
Proof: The detailed proof is provided in Appendix C. The outline of the proof is as follows: We begin with
the expression for the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC with a fixed n, Cn−CGs , stated in Proposition 2; We
show that (10c) can be expressed as an average over n samples of a Riemann integrable even function over the
range [0, 2π). Thus, by definition of Riemann integrability [43, Ch. 6], it follows that for n→∞, (10c) converges
to (6c), and that the energy constraint in (10a) asymptotically coincides with the energy constraint in (6a).
From Proposition 1 it follows that Cs = lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs . Therefore, it follows from Proposition 3 that Cs is given
by (6), which completes the proof of Thm. 1.
IV. DISCUSSION AND NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In the following we discuss the insights obtained from the results derived above. In Subsection IV-A we present a
necessary and sufficient condition for non-zero secrecy capacity; Then, in Subsection IV-B we present the application
of our result to the characterization of the secrecy capacity of narrowband PLC channels; Lastly, in Subsection IV-C
we show that the secrecy capacity of the scalar finite-memory LTI Gaussian WTC can be obtained in closed-form,
and provide numerical examples.
A. Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Cs > 0
The secrecy capacity expression (6c) is the solution to a non-convex optimization problem (see, e.g., [6] for the
memoryless case), which makes it hard to directly develop a practical interpretation. To assist with the understanding
of Thm. 1 , we now present a necessary and sufficient condition for non-zero secrecy capacity, which follows from
Thm. 1.
Proposition 4. Define H′w(ω) , (C′W(ω))−
1
2 H′ (ω) and G′w(ω) , (C′U(ω))
− 12 G′ (ω). The secrecy capacity of the
LGMWTC is strictly positive if and only if ∃Ω ⊂ [0, π) with a non-zero Lebesgue measure, such that ∀ω ∈ Ω
sup
v(ω)∈Cnt×1
‖H′w(ω)v (ω)‖
‖G′w(ω)v (ω)‖
> 1. (11)
Proof: The proof is similar to that of [6, Corollary 2], and is provided in Appendix D.
Note that the vector v (ω) can be considered as a beamforming vector. Therefore, Proposition 4 implies that the
secrecy capacity is strictly positive only when there exists a continuous set of frequencies for which the sender can
beamform the transmitted signal such that the intended receiver observes a higher SNR than the eavesdropper at
each frequency in the set of frequencies.
B. Application: The Secrecy Capacity of Narrowband PLC Channels
An important application of our result is the characterization of the secrecy capacity of scalar PLC channels in
the frequency range of 3 − 500 kHz, referred to as narrowband (NB) PLC. NB-PLC plays an important role in
the realization of smart power grids [44], in which secure communications is a critical issue [44]–[46]. Despite the
importance of secure NB-PLC, to date there is no characterization of the secrecy capacity for this channel, which
accounts for its unique characteristics [34]: The NB-PLC channel is a linear channel with additive noise , in which
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the channel impulse response (CIR) is commonly modeled as a real periodically time-varying signal with a finite
memory [47], [48], while the additive noise is commonly modeled as a real cyclostationary Gaussian process with
a finite correlation length [48], [49]. In the following we fill the knowledge gap of secure communications rates
over NB-PLC channels by characterizing the secrecy capacity of the NB-PLC wiretap channel.
Let WPLC[i] and UPLC[i] be zero-mean scalar additive cyclostationary Gaussian noises (ACGNs), each with
a period of tnoise and a temporal correlation which has a finite-duration, whose length is mnoise. Let mch be
a non-negative integer representing the length of the memory of the NB-PLC CIR, and let {hPLC[i, τ ]}mchτ=0 and
{gPLC[i, τ ]}mchτ=0 denote the channel coefficients of the Tx-Rx channel and of the Tx-Ev channel, respectively, both
with period1 tch, i.e., hPLC[i, τ ] = hPLC[i+tch, τ ] and gPLC[i, τ ] = gPLC[i+tch, τ ], ∀i,∈ Z, ∀τ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,mch−
1}, and hPLC[i, τ ] = gPLC[i, τ ] = 0, for all integer τ < 0 or τ > mch. Let mPLC = max {mch,mnoise}. We
use X [i] to denote the transmitted scalar signal, and YPLC[i] and ZPLC[i] to denote the channel outputs at the
destination and at the eavesdropper, respectively, all at time i. The input-output relationships of the NB-PLC WTC
can be written as
YPLC[i] =
mPLC∑
τ=0
hPLC[i, τ ]X [i− τ ] +WPLC[i] (12a)
ZPLC[i] =
mPLC∑
τ=0
gPLC[i, τ ]X [i− τ ] + UPLC[i]. (12b)
Set nPLC to be the least common multiple of tch and tnoise which satisfies nPLC > mPLC. We assume that the
channel input is subject to an average power constraint
1
l
l−1∑
k=0
E
{∣∣X [i]∣∣2} ≤ P, (13a)
for any blocklength l, and we assume that for all i ≥ 0 it holds that
1
nPLC
nPLC−1∑
k=0
E
{∣∣X [i · nPLC + k]∣∣2} ≤ P, (13b)
i.e., over any block of nPLC symbols, starting from the first transmitted symbol, the average power is upper bound
by P . Applying the decimated components decomposition [50, Sec. 17.2] to the cyclostationary processes WPLC[i]
and UPLC[i], we define the nPLC × 1 multivariate processes WPLC
[
i˜
]
and UPLC
[
i˜
]
, i˜ ∈ Z, whose elements
are given by
(
WPLC
[
i˜
])
k
= WPLC
[
i˜ · nPLC + k
]
and
(
UPLC
[
i˜
])
k
= UPLC
[
i˜ · nPLC + k
]
, respectively,
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nPLC − 1} , NPLC. From [50, Sec. 17.2] it follows that WPLC
[
i˜
]
and UPLC
[
i˜
]
are each
a stationary Gaussian process. Let CWPLC [ τ˜ ] and CUPLC [ τ˜ ] denote the autocorrelation function of WPLC
[
i˜
]
and the autocorrelation function of UPLC
[
i˜
]
, respectively. Finally, let HPLC [ τ˜ ] and GPLC [ τ˜ ], τ˜ ∈ {0, 1}, be
1In NB-PLC systems, tch is equal to the mains period and tnoise is equal to half the mains period [48]. However, our secrecy capacity
result applies also to the more general case in which the periods of the Tx-Rx CIR and of the Tx-Ev CIR are not identical, by setting tch to
be the least common multiple of these periods. The same applies to the noises and tnoise, see further explanations in [51, Footnote 1].
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nPLC × nPLC matrices whose entries at the k1-th row and the k2-th column are given in (14), ∀k1, k2 ∈ NPLC.
(HPLC[0])k1,k2 =


hPLC [k1, k1 − k2] , 0 ≤ k1 − k2 ≤ mPLC
0, otherwise
, (14a)
(HPLC[1])k1,k2 =


hPLC [k1, nPLC + k1 − k2] , 1 ≤ nPLC + k1 − k2 ≤ mPLC
0, otherwise
, (14b)
(GPLC[0])k1,k2 =


gPLC [k1, k1 − k2] , 0 ≤ k1 − k2 ≤ mPLC
0, otherwise
, (14c)
(GPLC[1])k1,k2 =


gPLC [k1, nPLC + k1 − k2] , 1 ≤ nPLC + k1 − k2 ≤ mPLC
0, otherwise
. (14d)
The secrecy capacity of the NB-PLC WTC is stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Consider the NB-PLC WTC defined in (12), subject to the power constraints (13). Define C′
WPLC
(ω),
1∑
τ˜=−1
CWPLC [ τ˜ ] e
−jωτ˜
, C′
UPLC
(ω) ,
1∑
τ˜=−1
CUPLC [ τ˜ ] e
−jωτ˜
, H′PLC(ω) ,
1∑
τ˜=0
HPLC [ τ˜ ] e
−jωτ˜
, and G′PLC(ω) ,
1∑
τ˜=0
GPLC [ τ˜ ] e
−jωτ˜
.
Let CPLCP denote the set of nPLC × nPLC positive semi-definite Hermitian matrix functions C′X (ω) defined over
the interval ω ∈ [0, π), which satisfy
1
π
π∫
ω=0
Tr
(
C′
X
(ω)
)
dω ≤ P · nPLC, (15a)
Then, the secrecy capacity of the NB-PLC WTC is given by
Cs,PLC =
1
nPLC
max
C′
X
(ω)∈CPLC
P
1
2π
π∫
ω=0
logψPLC(ω)dω. (15b)
Proof: The proof follows from the representation of NB-PLC channels as Gaussian MIMO channels with finite
memory, see, e.g., [51, Appendix B], and is provided in Appendix E.
C. Scalar Gaussian WTCs with Finite Memory
To analytically evaluate (6c) it is required to search over all possible input correlation matrix functions in CP .
However, for the special case of the scalar linear Gaussian WTC (LGWTC), obtained from the general model by
setting nt = nr = ne = 1, the secrecy capacity can be obtained explicitly. This result is stated in the following
corollary:
Corollary 2. Consider the scalar LGWTC. Define the scalar functions h′ (ω) , H′ (ω), g′ (ω) , G′ (ω), c′W (ω) ,
C′
W
(ω), c′U (ω) , C
′
U
(ω), α′r (ω) ,
|h′(ω)|2
c′W (ω)
, and α′e (ω) ,
|g′(ω)|2
c′U (ω)
, where the domain for all the functions is
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[0, π). The secrecy capacity of the scalar LGWTC is given by
Cs,Scalar =
1
2π
π∫
ω=0
log
(
1 + α′r (ω) c
′
X (ω)
1 + α′e (ω) c
′
X (ω)
)
dω, (16a)
where c′X (ω), ω ∈ [0, π), is obtained as follows: If α′r (ω) ≤ α′e (ω) then c′X (ω) = 0, otherwise
c′X (ω) =
(√(
α′r (ω)− α′e (ω)
2α′r (ω)α
′
e (ω)
)2
+
α′r (ω)− α′e (ω)
µ′ · α′r (ω)α′e (ω)
− α
′
r (ω) + α
′
e (ω)
2α′r (ω)α
′
e (ω)
)+
, (16b)
and µ′ > 0 is selected such that 1
π
π∫
0
c′X (ω) dω = P .
Proof: For the scalar n-block memoryless circular Gaussian WTC (n-CGWTC), define the scalar functions
hˆ[k] , Hˆ[k], gˆ[k] , Gˆ[k], c ˆ
˜
W
[k] , C
˜
Wˆ
[k], c ˆ
˜
U
[k] , C
˜
Uˆ
[k], αr[k] ,
∣∣hˆ[k]∣∣2
c ˆ
˜
W [k]
, and αe[k] ,
∣∣gˆ[k]∣∣2
c ˆ
˜
U [k]
, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−
1}. The secrecy capacity of the scalar n-CGWTC is given by the solution of the optimization problem in (10) with
the matrices replaced by the corresponding scalar quantities. The resulting expression is [21, Thm. 1], [19, Thm.
2]:
Cn−CGs,Scalar =
1
2n
n−1∑
k=0
log
(
1 + αr[k]cXˆ [k]
1 + αe[k]cXˆ [k]
)
, (17a)
where c
Xˆ
[k], k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, is obtained as follows: If αr[k] ≤ αe[k] then cXˆ [k] = 0, otherwise
cXˆ [k] =
(√(
αr[k]− αe[k]
2αr[k]αe[k]
)2
+
αr[k]− αe[k]
µ · αr[k]αe[k] −
αr[k] + αe[k]
2αr[k]αe[k]
)+
, (17b)
and µ > 0 is selected such that
n−1∑
k=0
c
Xˆ
[k] = n2P .
Now, it follows from Proposition 1 that Cs,Scalar= lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs,Scalar, thus, the corollary is proved by first showing
that in the limit of n → ∞ the power constraint on c
Xˆ
[k] (17b) converges to the power constraint on c′X (ω) in
(16b), and then showing that (17a) can be expressed as an average over n samples of a Riemann integrable even
function2 over the range [0, 2π). Therefore, from [43, Ch. 6], it follows for n → ∞, (17a) coincides with (16a).
As these steps are essentially the same as the steps in the proof of Proposition 3, they are not repeated here.
While Corollary 2 applies only to scalar Gaussian WTCs with finite memory, it facilitates a deeper understanding
of the main result stated in Thm. 1: Recall that for scalar Gaussian WTCs without memory, i.e., without ISI and
with AWGN, the secrecy capacity is zero if the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the intended receiver (SNRr) is
less than or equal to the SNR at the eavesdropper (SNRe) [4]. In contrast, Corollary 2 and Proposition 4 imply
that for scalar Gaussian WTCs with finite memory, the secrecy capacity is zero if and only if α′r (ω) ≤ α′e (ω)
for all sets Ω ⊂ [0, π) of positive Lebesgue measure. This implies that Cs,Scalar is zero if and only if the “SNR
density” at the intended receiver, i.e., |h
′(ω)|2
c′
W
(ω) , is less than that at the eavesdropper, i.e.,
|g′(ω)|2
c′
U
(ω) , over the entire
frequency range. It thus follows that the finite memory of the channel introduces additional degrees-of-freedom for
2The function is even in the sense that for 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋, then ξ[k] , log
(
1+αr[k]cXˆ [k]
1+αe[k]cXˆ [k]
)
satisfies ξ[k] = ξ[n− k].
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Fig. 1. The magnitudes of h′ (ω) and g′ (ω). The shadowed region corresponds to frequencies in which |h′ (ω) | ≥ |g′ (ω) |.
concealing the information from the eavesdropper. To demonstrate this, consider the following two-tap channels to
the receiver and to the eavesdropper, respectively: h′ (ω) = 1 + e−jω and g′ (ω) = 3.1 − 3.1e−jω. Let the noises
in both channels be AWGN with unit variance, thus, SNRr ≈ 3[dB] while SNRe ≈ 13[dB]. The magnitude of
the frequency response for these two channels is depicted in Fig. 1. From the above discussion it follows that the
shaded region in which |h′ (ω) | ≥ |g′ (ω) | facilitates a positive secrecy capacity, and this is achieved by waterfilling
over this region according to (16b). Therefore, although SNRe is 10[dB] higher than SNRr , the secrecy capacity
of this channel, derived via (16), is 0.21 bits per channel use.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we characterized for the first time the secrecy capacity of finite-memory MIMO Gaussian WTCs.
The secrecy capacity is derived via the analysis of an equivalent multivariate block-memoryless channel model,
and the result is stated as a maximization over the input covariance matrices in the frequency domain. Based on
the capacity characterization we were able to characterize a necessary and sufficient condition for non-zero secrecy
capacity. We also derived the secrecy capacity of narrowband PLC channels, as a special case of the main result,
thereby resolving one of the major open problems for this communications channel. For the scalar case, we explicitly
demonstrated that the frequency selectivity of the channel can be utilized to facilitate secure communications over
scenarios in which the SNR at the intended receiver is less than the SNR at the eavesdropper.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In order to prove that Cs is obtained from Cn−CGs by taking n → ∞, we begin by characterizing the secrecy
capacity of the n-MGMWTC, which was defined in the proof outline in Subsection III-A. This capacity is
characterized in Subsection A-A. Then, in Subsection A-B we show that Cs can be obtained from the secrecy
capacity of the n-MGMWTC by taking n→∞. Lastly, in Subsection A-C we show that for n→∞, the secrecy
capacity of the n-MGMWTC is equal to the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC. Combining these results we
obtain (9).
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Define
Cn−MGs ,
1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1m )
}
. (A.1)
A. Characterizing the Secrecy Capacity of the n-MGMWTC
Before obtaining the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC, we note that the expression obtained by of Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner [2, Eq. (11)] can be extended to upper bound the secrecy capacity of nt×nr ×ne memoryless MIMO
channels with AWGN subject to a per-entry power constraint. Specifically, we consider the following MIMO WTC:
Y [i] = HX [i] +W [i] (A.2a)
Z [i] = GX [i] +U [i] , (A.2b)
where nt = K · n′t. The noises are AWGNs, hence this WTC is memoryless. The channel input whose size is
K ·n′t× 1, is treated as a group of K vectors, each of size n′t× 1, and is subject to an average power constraint P .
Thus, at time 0 ≤ i ≤ n−, the transmitted vector X[i] can be written as X [i] = [XT0 [i] ,XT1 [i] , . . . ,XTK−1 [i]]T ,
where each Xk[i] is subject to an average power constraint E
{
‖Xk [i]‖2
}
≤ P , 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
Lemma A.1. The secrecy capacity of the WTC (A.2) is upper bounded by
Cs ≤ sup
p(V,X):V→X→Y,Z,{E{‖Xk‖2}≤P}K−1
k=0
I (V;Y)− I (V;Z) . (A.3)
Proof: Consider Rs ≤ Cs. As Rs is achievable, then for all ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 > 0 and for all sufficiently large n there
exists an [R, n] code which satisfies
Pr
(
M 6= Mˆ
)
≤ ǫ1, (A.4a)
1
n
I
(
M ;Zn−1
) ≤ ǫ2, (A.4b)
and
R ≥ Rs − ǫ3. (A.4c)
From Fano’s inequality it follows that
H
(
M |Yn−1) ≤ 1 + Pr(M 6= Mˆ) · nR
≤ 1 + ǫ1 · nR. (A.5)
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Therefore,
I
(
M ;Yn−1
)− I (M ;Zn−1) = H (M)−H (M |Yn−1)− I (M ;Zn−1)
≥ nR− 1− ǫ1 · nR− ǫ2 · n
= (1− ǫ1)nR− 1− ǫ2 · n
≥ (1− ǫ1) (Rs − ǫ3)n− 1− ǫ2 · n. (A.6)
It follows from (A.6) that
(1− ǫ1) (Rs − ǫ3)− 1
n
− ǫ2 ≤ 1
n
(
I
(
M ;Yn−1
)− I (M ;Zn−1)) . (A.7)
From the chain rule for mutual information it follows that
I
(
M ;Yn−1
)− I (M ;Zn−1) = n−1∑
i=0
I
(
M ;Y [i]|Yi−1)− n−1∑
i=0
I
(
M ;Z [i]|Zn−1i+1
)
. (A.8)
Now,
I
(
M ;Y [i]|Yi−1) = h (Y [i]|Yi−1)− h (Y [i]|M,Yi−1)
(a)
= h
(
Y [i]|Yi−1)− h (Y [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 )
+ h
(
Y [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)− h (Y [i]|M,Yi−1)
(b)
= I
(
M,Zn−1i+1 ;Y [i]
∣∣Yi−1)− I (Zn−1i+1 ;Y [i]∣∣V,Yi−1)
(c)
= I
(
Zn−1i+1 ;Y [i]
∣∣Yi−1)+ I (M ;Y [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 )− I (Zn−1i+1 ;Y [i]∣∣V,Yi−1)
(d)
=
n−1∑
j=i+1
I
(
Z [j] ;Y [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1j+1
)
+ I
(
M ;Y [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)
−
n−1∑
j=i+1
I
(
Z [j] ;Y [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1j+1
)
,
where (a) follows by adding h
(
Y [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
) − h (Y [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 ) = 0, (b) follows from the
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definition of the conditional mutual information, (c) and (d) follow from the mutual information chain rule. Similarly,
I
(
M ;Z [i]|Zn−1i+1
)
= h
(
Z [i]|Zn−1i+1
)− h (Z [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 )
(a)
= h
(
Y [i]|Yi−1)− h (Y [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 )
+ h
(
Z [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)− h (Z [i]|M,Zn−1i+1 )
(b)
= I
(
V,Yi−1;Z [i]
∣∣Zn−1i+1 )− I (Yi−1;Z [i]∣∣M,Zn−1i+1 )
(c)
= I
(
Yi−1;Z [i]
∣∣Zn−1i+1 )+ I (M ;Z [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 )− I (Yi−1;Z [i]∣∣M,Zn−1i+1 )
(d)
=
i−1∑
j=0
I
(
Y [j] ;Z [i]|Yj−1,Zn−1i+1
)
+ I
(
M ;Z [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)
−
i−1∑
j=0
I
(
Y [j] ;Z [i]|M,Yj−1,Zn−1i+1
)
,
where (a) follows by adding h
(
Z [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
) − h (Z [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 ) = 0, (b) follows from the
definition of the conditional mutual information, (c) and (d) follow from the mutual information chain rule. Note
that
n−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=i+1
I
(
Z [j] ;Y [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1j+1
)
=
n−1∑
i=0
i−1∑
j=0
I
(
Y [j] ;Z [i]|Yj−1,Zn−1i+1
)
,
as both represent a sum over all possible values of I
(
Y [j] ;Z [i]|Yj−1,Zn−1i+1
)
with j, i ∈ {0 . . . n− 1} and j > i.
Similarly,
n−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=i+1
I
(
Z [j] ;Y [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1j+1
)
=
n−1∑
i=0
i−1∑
j=0
I
(
Y [j] ;Z [i]|M,Yj−1,Zn−1i+1
)
.
18
It therefore follows that (A.8) can be written as
I
(
M ;Yn−1
)− I (M ;Zn−1) = n−1∑
i=0
I
(
M ;Y [i]|Yi−1)− n−1∑
i=0
I
(
M ;Z [i]|Zn−1i+1
)
=
n−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=i+1
I
(
Z [j] ;Y [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1j+1
)
+
n−1∑
i=0
I
(
M ;Y [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)
−
n−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=i+1
I
(
Z [j] ;Y [i]|M,Yi−1,Zn−1j+1
)
−
n−1∑
i=0
i−1∑
j=0
I
(
Y [j] ;Z [i]|Yj−1,Zn−1i+1
)− n−1∑
i=0
I
(
M ;Z [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)
+
n−1∑
i=0
i−1∑
j=0
I
(
Y [j] ;Z [i]|M,Yj−1,Zn−1i+1
)
=
n−1∑
i=0
I
(
M ;Y [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)− n−1∑
i=0
I
(
M ;Z [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)
=
n−1∑
i=0
(
I
(
M ;Y [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)− I (M ;Z [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 )). (A.9)
Define T [i] ,
[
Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
]
and V [i] , [M,T [i]], thus (A.9) results in
I
(
M ;Yn−1
)− I (M ;Zn−1) = n−1∑
i=0
(
I
(
M ;Y [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1
)− I (M ;Z [i]|Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 ))
=
n−1∑
i=0
(I (M ;Y [i]|T [i])− I (M ;Z [i]|T [i]))
=
n−1∑
i=0
(I (M,T [i] ;Y [i]|T [i])− I (M,T [i] ;Z [i]|T [i]))
=
n−1∑
i=0
(I (V [i] ;Y [i]|T [i])− I (V [i] ;Z [i]|T [i])). (A.10)
Note that
p (T [i] ,V [i] ,X [i] ,Y [i] ,Z [i])
= p (T [i]) p (V [i]|T [i]) p (X [i]|V [i] ,T [i]) p (Y [i] ,Z [i]|X [i] ,V [i] ,T [i])
(a)
= p (T [i]) p (V [i]|T [i]) p (X [i]|V [i]) p (Y [i] ,Z [i]|X [i] ,M,Yi−1,Zn−1i+1 )
(b)
= p (T [i]) p (V [i]|T [i]) p (X [i]|V [i]) p (Y [i] ,Z [i]|X [i]) ,
where (a) follows from the definition of V [i], and (b) follows as the channel is memoryless and thus, given the
channel input at time i and the statistics of the output at time i, depends only on the statistics of the noises at time
i, which are mutually independent and memoryless. It thus follows that T [i]→ V [i]→ X [i]→ Y [i] ,Z [i] form
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a markov chain. Next, plugging (A.10) into (A.7) yields
(1− ǫ1) (Rs − ǫ3)− 1
n
− ǫ2 ≤ 1
n
n−1∑
i=0
(
I (V [i] ;Y [i]|T [i])− I (V [i] ;Z [i]|T [i])
)
. (A.11)
Define an RV Q uniformly distributed over 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. We can now write
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
(
I (V [i] ;Y [i]|T [i])− I (V [i] ;Z [i]|T [i])
)
= I (V[Q];Y[Q]|T[Q], Q)− I (V[Q];Z[Q]|T[Q], Q) .
(A.12)
Note that for any given set of chains T [i]→ V [i]→ X [i]→ Y [i] ,Z [i] the variable V[Q] can be defined such that
for different i’s, the pair (T [i] ,V [i]) is mapped into a unique set, thus we obtain the chain Q→ T[Q]→ V[Q]→
X[Q]→ Y[Q],Z[Q]. We note that from the definition of the channel, given X[Q] = x the joint distribution of the
output does no depend on Q, thus pY[Q],Z[Q]|X[Q] (y, z|x) = pY,Z|X (y, z|x), and that ∀k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}
E
{
‖Xk[Q]‖2
}
= EQ
{
E
{
‖Xk[Q]‖2
∣∣∣Q}} = 1
n
n−1∑
i=0
E
{
‖Xk [i]‖2
}
≤ P. (A.13)
Therefore, (A.12) can be written as
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
(
I (V [i] ;Y [i]|T [i])− I (V [i] ;Z [i]|T [i])
)
= I (V[Q];Y[Q]|T[Q])− I (V[Q];Z[Q]|T[Q])
(a)
= I (V[Q];Y|T[Q])− I (V[Q];Z|T[Q])
(b)
= I (V;Y|T)− I (V;Z|T) , (A.14)
where in (a) is due to the joint distribution
pY[Q],Z[Q],X[Q],V[Q],T[Q],Q (y, z,x,v, t, q) = pY[Q],Z[Q]|X[Q] (y, z|x) pX[Q],V[Q],T[Q],Q (x,v, t, q)
= pY,Z|X (y, z|x) pX[Q],V[Q],T[Q],Q (x,v, t, q) ,
and (b) follows from defining V , V[Q], T , T[Q], and X , X[Q] such that T→ V→ X form a Markov chain
and E
{
‖Xk‖2
}
≤ P for all 0 ≤ k ≤ K−1. This can be done since each realization of (V,T) = (v, t) corresponds
to a specific, unique value of Q, hence E
{
‖Xk‖2
}
= EV,T
{
E
{
‖Xk‖2
∣∣∣V,T}} = EQ {E{‖Xk‖2∣∣∣Q}}.
Therefore,
(1− ǫ1) (Rs − ǫ3)− 1
n
− ǫ2 ≤ I (V;Y|T)− I (V;Z|T) . (A.15)
Next, For a given p (T,V) p (X|V) where T → V → X form a Markov chain and E
{
‖Xk‖2
}
≤ P for all
0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, let T denote the set of all possible values of T. We note that ∃t˜ ∈ T such that
I (V;Y|T)− I (V;Z|T) =
∫
t∈T
I (V;Y|T = t)− I (V;Z|T = t) pT (t) dt
(a)
≤ I (V;Y|T = t˜)− I (V;Z|T = t˜) , (A.16)
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where (a) follows is since if ∀t′ ∈ T ,
I (V;Y|T=t′)−I (V;Z|T=t′) <
∫
t∈T
I (V;Y|T=t)−I (V;Z|T=t) pT (t) dt,
then necessarily
∫
t′∈T
I (V;Y|T=t′)−I (V;Z|T=t′) pT (t′) dt′ <
∫
t′∈T

 ∫
t∈T
I (V;Y|T=t)−I (V;Z|T=t) pT (t) dt

 pT (t′) dt′
=
∫
t∈T
I (V;Y|T=t)−I (V;Z|T=t) pT (t) dt,
which is a contradiction. It follows from (A.16) that the conditional mutual information I (V;Y|T)− I (V;Z|T)
is upper bounded by maximizing the input distribution at a single value of T. Since T→ V → X→ Y,Z form
a Markov chain, it follows that the maximum is characterized by considering only the set of joint distributions
p (X,V) which satisfy E
{
‖Xk‖2
}
≤ P for all 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. It therefore follows from (A.15) that
(1− ǫ1) (Rs − ǫ3)− 1
n
− ǫ2 ≤ sup
p(V,X):V→X→Y,Z,{E{‖Xk‖2}≤P}K−1
k=0
I (V;Y)− I (V;Z) . (A.17)
Note that (A.17) holds for all ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 > 0 and for all sufficiently large n. Thus, as the supremum is the least
upper bound [43, Def. 1.8], it follows from taking the supremum left hand side of (A.18) over n, ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 that
Rs ≤ sup
p(V,X):V→X→Y,Z,{E{‖Xk‖2}≤P}K−1
k=0
I (V;Y)− I (V;Z) . (A.18)
and therefore,
Cs ≤ sup
p(V,X):V→X→Y,Z,{E{‖Xk‖2}≤P}K−1
k=0
I (V;Y)− I (V;Z) .
The secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition A.1. The secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC defined in Subsection III-A is given by Cn−MGs .
Proof: In order to obtain the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC defined in Subsection III-A, we first show
that Cn−MGs is the maximum achievable secrecy rate for the n-MGMWTC when considering only codes whose
blocklength is an integer multiple of n, i.e, [R, b · n] codes, where b ∈ N. Then, we show that any secrecy rate
achievable for the n-MGMWTC can be achieved by considering only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple
of n.
Let us consider the n-MGMWTC constrained to using only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of
n. In this case, we can represent the channel as an equivalent n · nt × (n−m) · nr × (n−m) · ne MIMO WTC
(without loss of information), via the following assignments: Define the input of the transformed channel at time
i ∈ N by the n · nt × 1 vector Xeq
[
i˜
]
, X
(i˜+1)·n−1
i˜·n
, i˜ ≥ 0, the output at the intended receiver at time i ∈ N
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by the (n −m) · nr × 1 vector Yeq
[
i˜
]
, Y
(i˜+1)·n−1
i˜·n+m
, and the output at the eavesdropper at time i˜ ∈ N by the
(n−m) ·ne×1 vector Zeq
[
i˜
]
, Z
(˜i+1)·n−1
i˜·n+m
. The transformation is clearly bijective, and thus, the secrecy capacity
of the equivalent channel is equal to the secrecy capacity of the original n-MGMWTC. Since the n-MGMWTC
is n-block memoryless, it follows from Def. 6 that the equivalent transformed MIMO channel obtained above is
memoryless, with the transmitter having n times more antennas than in the n-MGMWTC, and both the intended
receiver and the eavesdropper having (n−m) times more antennas than in the n-MGMWTC. The signals received at
the intended receiver and at the eavesdropper are corrupted by the additive noise vectors Weq
[
i˜
]
,W
(˜i+1)·n−1
i˜·n+m
and Ueq
[
i˜
]
, U
(i˜+1)·n−1
i˜·n+m
, respectively. From the noise characterization in Subsection II-B and the definition
of the n-MGMWTC, it follows that both Weq
[
i˜
]
and Ueq
[
i˜
]
are zero-mean Gaussian with positive-definite
covariance matrices (since the elements of the random vectors are not linearly dependent, see [57, Ch. 8.1]), and
each process Weq
[
i˜
]
and Ueq
[
i˜
]
is i.i.d. in time (here we refer to the index i˜ as ”time”). The secrecy capacity
of the transformed channel, denoted Qeqn , can be expressed in the form of the result of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2, Eq.
(11)]3
Qeqn = sup
p(Veq ,Xeq)
{
I (Veq;Yeq)− I (Veq ;Zeq)
}
(a)
= sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1m )
}
, (A.19)
where (a) follows from the definition of the quantities used in the equivalent channel, and E
{
‖X[i]‖2
}
≤
P, ∀0 ≤ i < n corresponds to the per-symbol power constraint of the n-MGMWTC. As every channel use in
the transformed MIMO channel corresponds to n channel uses in the n-MGMWTC, it follows from (A.19) that the
maximal achievable secrecy rate of the n-MGMWTC in bits per channel use, subject to the restriction that only
codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n are allowed, is 1
n
Qeqn = C
n−MG
s .
Next, we show that any secrecy rate achievable for the n-MGMWTC can be achieved by considering only codes
whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n: Consider a secrecy rate Rs achievable for the n-MGMWTC and fix
ǫ1 > 0, ǫ2 > 0, ǫ3 > 0. From Def. 4 it follows that ∃l0 > 0 such that ∀l > l0 there exists an [R, l] code which
satisfies (4a)-(4c). Thus, by setting b0 as the smallest integer for which b0 · n ≥ l0, it follows that for all integer
b > b0 there exists an [R, b · n] code which satisfies (4a)-(4c). Therefore, the secrecy rate Rs is also achievable
when considering only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n. We thus conclude that Cn−MGs is the
maximum achievable secrecy rate for the n-MGMWTC.
3While [2] considered discrete alphabets, it is noted that the result can be extended to incorporate continuous-valued power-constrained inputs
as considered in this paper, see [2, Sec. VI], [3, Ch. 5.1], [6, Sec. IV.A], and [8, Sec. I].
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B. Proving that Cs = lim
n→∞
Cn−MGs
Next, we prove that the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC, Cs, coincides with Cn−MGs in the limit of n→∞.
We begin by defining
Cn (s0),
1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1
∣∣S0=s0)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1∣∣S0=s0)
}
. (A.20)
The outline of the proof is as follows:
• First, we show in Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3 that for the LGMWTC (2), the mutual information between
the channel inputs and any m channel outputs can be upper bounded by a fixed and finite number.
• Next, in Lemma A.4, we prove that Cs ≤ inf
s0∈S0
(
lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s0)
)
.
• Then, in Lemma A.5, we show that inf
s0∈S0
(
lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s0)
)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
Cn−MGs .
• Lastly, in Lemma A.6, we prove that lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs ≤ Cs.
By combining these lemmas, we conclude in Proposition A.2 that the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC is equal
to lim
n→∞
Cn−MGs and that the limit exists.
Lemma A.2. There exists a finite and fixed η > 0, such that for all positive integers a, b, n, l, satisfying b > l,
n > 2m, and n+m > a ≥ m, it holds that
I
(
Xb·n+a−1;Za+m−1a
∣∣∣Zn+a−1a+m ,Z2n+a−1n+a+m , . . . ,Zb·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,Ua−1a−m
)
≤ η, (A.21a)
and
I
(
Xb·n+a−1;Zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a
∣∣∣Zn+a−1a+m ,Z2n+a−1n+a+m , . . . ,Zb·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,
Za+m−1a ,Z
n+a+m−1
n+a , . . . ,Z
(l−1)·n+a+m−1
(l−1)·n+a ,U
a−1
a−m
)
≤ η. (A.21b)
Proof: We begin by describing the underlying principle of the lemma, after which we present a detailed
proof. From the input-output relationship of the LGMWTC (2) it follows that any sequence of k > 0 consecutive
channel outputs corresponding to indexes i0, i0 + 1, . . . , i0 + k − 1, when their subsequent and preceding channel
outputs are given, depends on the channel inputs at indexes i0 − m, i0 − m + 1, . . . , i0 + k − 1, due to the
finite length of the channel impulse response, and the dependence extends also to the channel inputs at indexes
{i0 − 2m, i0 − 2m+ 1, . . . , i0 −m − 1} ∪ {i0 + k, i0 + k + 1 . . . , i0 + k +m − 1}, due to the temporal span of
the noise correlation. The latter follows as, given the corresponding channel outputs, these inputs are statistically
dependent on the noise at these indexes. Therefore, similarly to the derivation in [53, Eq. (63)-(65)], we obtain that
each of the two conditional mutual information expressions in (A.21) is upper-bounded by the mean of a quadratic
function of at most 4m channel inputs. Since the channel input X[i] is subject to a per-symbol power constraint,
the lemma follows.
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Let nq be a positive integer. In order to reduce notation clutter, for a sequence q[k] ∈ Rnq , k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1},
and a function f : Rn·nq 7→ R, we abbreviate the integration ∫
R
nq · · ·
∫
R
nq f
(
qn−1
)
dq[0] · · · dq[n − 1] as∫
f
(
qn−1
)
dqn−1. Define Zˇ ,
(
Zn+a−1a+2m ,Z
2n+a−1
n+a+m ,Z
3n+a−1
2n+a+m, . . . ,Z
b·n+a−1
(b−1)·n+a+m
)
. We now show that I
(
Xb·n+a−1
;Za+m−1a
∣∣∣Zn+a−1a+m ,Z2n+a−1n+a+m , . . . , Zb·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,Ua−1a−m) = I( Xb·n+a−1;Za+m−1a ∣∣Za+2m−1a+m , Zˇ,Ua−1a−m) is upper-bounded
by a fixed constant. From the definition of the conditional mutual information of continuous random vectors [38,
Eq. 2.4.20], it follows that
I
(
Xb·n+a−1;Za+m−1a
∣∣Za+2m−1a+m , Zˇ,Ua−1a−m)
=
∫
p
Z
a+2m−1
a ,Xb·n+a−1,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+2m−1a ,x
b·n+a−1, zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
× log
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Xb·n+a−1,Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |xb·n+a−1, za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
) dza+2m−1a dxb·n+a−1dzˇ dua−1a−m
=
∫
p
Z
a+2m−1
a ,Xb·n+a−1,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+2m−1a ,x
b·n+a−1, zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
×
(
log
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Xb·n+a−1,Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |xb·n+a−1, za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
p
U
a+m−1
a |U
a+2m−1
a+m ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m ,ua−1a−m
)
− log
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
p
U
a+m−1
a |U
a+2m−1
a+m ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m ,ua−1a−m
)
)
dza+2m−1a dx
b·n+a−1dzˇ dua−1a−m. (A.22)
Note that ∫
p
Z
a+2m−1
a ,Xb·n+a−1,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+2m−1a ,x
b·n+a−1, zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
× log
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
p
U
a+m−1
a |U
a+2m−1
a+m ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m ,ua−1a−m
) dza+2m−1a dxb·n+a−1dzˇ dua−1a−m
=
∫
p
Z
a+2m−1
a ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+2m−1a , zˇ,u
a−1
a−m
)
× log
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
p
U
a+m−1
a |U
a+2m−1
a+m ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m ,ua−1a−m
) dza+2m−1a dzˇ dua−1a−m. (A.23)
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Let DKL(f ||g) denote the Kullback-Leiber divergence between two densities f and g [52, Ch. 8.5]. Note that∫
p
Z
a+2m−1
a ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+2m−1a , zˇ,u
a−1
a−m
)
× log
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
p
U
a+m−1
a |U
a+2m−1
a+m ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m ,ua−1a−m
) dza+2m−1a dzˇ dua−1a−m
=
∫ (∫
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
log
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
p
U
a+m−1
a |U
a+2m−1
a+m ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m ,ua−1a−m
) dza+m−1a
)
× p
Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,u
a−1
a−m
)
dza+2m−1a+m dzˇ du
a−1
a−m
=
∫
DKL
(
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Z
a+2m−1
a+m =z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ=zˇ,U
a−1
a−m=u
a−1
a−m
∥∥∥ p
U
a+m−1
a |U
a+2m−1
a+m =z
a+2m−1
a+m ,U
a−1
a−m=u
a−1
a−m
)
× p
Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,u
a−1
a−m
)
dza+2m−1a+m dzˇ du
a−1
a−m
(a)
≥ 0,
where (a) follows as DKL(f ||g) ≥ 0 for all densities f and g [52, Thm. 8.6.1]. It therefore follows that (A.23) is
non-negative, thus (A.22) implies that
I
(
Xb·n+a−1;Za+m−1a
∣∣Za+2m−1a+m , Zˇ,Ua−1a−m) ≤
∫
p
Z
a+2m−1
a ,Xb·n+a−1,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+2m−1a ,x
b·n+a−1, zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
× log
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Xb·n+a−1,Z
a+2m−1
a+m ,Zˇ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |xb·n+a−1, za+2m−1a+m , zˇ,ua−1a−m
)
p
U
a+m−1
a |U
a+2m−1
a+m ,U
a−1
a−m
(
za+m−1a |za+2m−1a+m ,ua−1a−m
) dza+2m−1a dxb·n+a−1dzˇ dua−1a−m. (A.24)
Define Uˇ ,
(
Ua+n−1a+2m ,U
2n+a−1
n+a+m , . . . ,U
b·n+a−1
(b−1)·n+a+m
)
. From the input-output relationship of the LGMWTC it fol-
lows that ∃G ∈ R(ne·m)×(nt·2m) such that Za+m−1a = GXa+m−1a−m +Ua+m−1a , and ∃Gˇ ∈ R(ne·(b·(n−m)−m))×(nt·(b·n+a))
such that Zˇ = GˇXb·n+a−1 + Uˇ. As the LGMWTC is time-invariant it also follows that Za+2m−1a+m = GXa+2m−1a +
Ua+2m−1a+m . Next, we note that
p
Z
a+m−1
a |Xb·n+a−1,Z
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= p
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(a)
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∣∣ za+2m−1a+m − Gxa+2m−1a ,ua−1a−m) ,
where (a) follows since Ua+m−1a is statistically independent of the channel inputs Xb·n+a−1, and since the temporal
correlation of the multivariate Gaussian process U[i] is finite and shorter than m+ 1, which implies that Ua+m−1a
is also mutually independent of Uˇ. Let C
U
a+m−1
a
be the covariance matrix of Ua+m−1a . As the noise samples are not
linearly dependent it follows that C
U
a+m−1
a
is invertible. Define
C
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a U
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a+m
, E
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(
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)T}
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a U
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)T}
,
25
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,
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a U
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a
)−1(
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a U
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a+m
)T
−C
U
a+m−1
a U
a−1
a−m
(
C
U
a+m−1
a
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a U
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a−m
)T
. (A.25)
Note that Ua+m−1a and
[(
Ua+2m−1a+m
)T
,
(
Ua−1a−m
)T ]T
are jointly Gaussian, therefore, the conditional distribution
Ua+m−1a |
[(
Ua+2m−1a+m
)T
,
(
Ua−1a−m
)T ]T
=
[(
ua+2m−1a+m
)T
,
(
ua−1a−m
)T ]T is a multivariate Gaussian distribution [59, Propo-
sition 3.13] with mean vector
E
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∣∣ [(Ua+2m−1a+m )T , (Ua−1a−m)T ]T = [(ua+2m−1a+m )T , (ua−1a−m)T ]T
}
(a)
= E
{
Ua+m−1a
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)T
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)T ]}(
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)T ]T
(b)
=
[
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U
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a U
a+2m−1
a+m
C
U
a+m−1
a U
a−1
a−m
]CUa+m−1a 0
0 C
U
a+m−1
a


−1 
ua+2m−1a+m
ua−1a−m


= M1u
a−1
a−m +M2u
a+2m−1
a+m ,
where (a) follows from [59, Proposition 3.13] as both U[i] is zero-mean; (b) follows from the finite temporal corre-
lation and the stationarity of U[i] which implies that E
{
Ua+2m−1a+m
(
Ua−1a−m
)T}
= 0 and E
{
Ua+2m−1a+m
(
Ua+2m−1a+m
)T}
=
E
{
Ua−1a−m
(
Ua−1a−m
)T}
= C
U
a+m−1
a
. Similarly, it follows from [59, Proposition 3.13] that the covariance matrix of the
conditional distribution Ua+m−1a |
[(
Ua+2m−1a+m
)T
,
(
Ua−1a−m
)T ]T
=
[(
ua+2m−1a+m
)T
,
(
ua−1a−m
)T ]T is Q defined in (A.25).
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It therefore follows that
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.
Plugging this into (A.24) yields
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. (A.26)
Now, note that∫
p
X
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. (A.27)
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Also note that∫
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where (a) follows since Za+m−1a = GXa+m−1a−m +Ua+m−1a and Za+2m−1a+m = GXa+2m−1a +Ua+2m−1a+m , and since the mean
of the noise U[i] is zero and U[i] is independent of the channel input X[i]. Plugging (A.29) into (A.28) yields∫
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Plugging (A.27) and (A.30) into (A.26) yields
I
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, (A.31)
with Q defined in (A.25). Note that the expression in (A.31) is the mean of a quadratic function of 3m channel
inputs, which depends only on the noise correlation function through Q, the channel transfer function through G,
and the power of the input signal. Consequently, ∃ {αi1}a+2m−1i1=a−m ∈ R, |αi1 | < ∞, such that (A.31) can be written
as
I
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where (b) follows since the input signal X[i] is subject to a per-symbol power constraint. It follows from (A.32)
that ∃η finite such that I (Xb·n+a−1;Za+m−1a ∣∣Za+2m−1a+m , Zˇ,Ua−1a−m) ≤ η.
Next, we prove (A.21b) using a similar derivation: Note that
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(A.33)
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where (a) follows as DKL(f ||g) ≥ 0 for all densities f and g [52, Thm. 8.6.1]. It therefore follows that (A.34) is
non - negative, thus (A.33) implies that
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(A.35)
Define U′ ,
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. Note
that since the channel is LTI, then ∃G,G1,G2 such that Z˜ = G1Xb·n+a−1+U˜, Z′ = G2Xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m +U′, Zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m =
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l·n+a , and Z
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a+m = GX
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a +U
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a+m .
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Now,
p
Z
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a |X
b·n+a−1,Z′,Z˜,U
a−1
a−m
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a |xb·n+a−1, z′, z˜,ua−1a−m
)
= p
U
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a
|Xb·n+a−1,U′,U˜,Ua−1a−m
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m |xb·n+a−1, z′−G2xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m , z˜−G1xb·n+a−1,ua−1a−m
)
= p
U
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a |U
′
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m |z′−G2xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
)
= p
U
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a |U
l·n+a−1
l·n+a−m,U
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a+m
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m |zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m, zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m −Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a
)
.
(A.36)
From the stationarity of U[i] it follows that Ul·n+a+m−1l·n+a |Ul·n+a−1l·n+a−m,Ul·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m d= Ua+m−1a |Ua−1a−m,Ua+2m−1a+m . As was
shown in the proof of (A.21a), Eqn. (A.36) implies that
log
p
Z
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a |X
b·n+a−1,Z′,Z˜,U
a−1
a−m
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a |xb·n+a−1, z′, z˜,ua−1a−m
)
p
U
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a |U
l·n+a−1
l·n+a−m,U
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a+m
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a |zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m, zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m
)
= log
p
U
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a |U
l·n+a−1
l·n+a−m,U
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a+m
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m |zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m, zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m −Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a
)
p
U
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a |U
l·n+a−1
l·n+a−m,U
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a+m
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a |zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m, zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m
)
=−1
2
log e · (zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1 (zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m)−M2 (zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m −Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ))TQ−1
× (zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1 (zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m)−M2 (zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m −Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ))
+
1
2
log e · (zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −M1zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−M2zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m )TQ−1 (zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −M1zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−M2zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m )
= log e · (zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −M1zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−M2zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m )TQ−1 (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a )
− 1
2
log e · (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a )TQ−1 (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ) .
(A.37)
Plugging (A.37) into (A.35) yields
I
(
Xb·n+a−1;Zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a
∣∣Zl·n+a−1a ,Z(l+1)·n+a−1l·n+a+m , . . . ,Zb·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,Ua−1a−m)
≤ log e ·
∫
p
Z
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a ,X
b·n+a−1,Z′,Z˜,U
a−1
a−m
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a ,x
b·n+a−1, z′, z˜,ua−1a−m
)(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −M1zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−M2zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m
)T
Q−1
× (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ) dzl·n+a+m−1l·n+a dxb·n+a−1dz′dz˜dua−1a−m
− 1
2
log e ·
∫
p
Z
l·n+a+m−1
l·n+a ,X
b·n+a−1,Z′,Z˜,U
a−1
a−m
(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a ,x
b·n+a−1, z′, z˜,ua−1a−m
)(
Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a
)T
× Q−1 (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ) dzl·n+a+m−1l·n+a dxb·n+a−1dz′dz˜dua−1a−m
= log e ·
∫
p
Z
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−m
,Xl·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
(
zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−m ,x
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
)(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −M1zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−M2zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m
)T
Q−1
× (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ) dzl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−m dxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
− 1
2
log e ·
∫
p
X
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
(
xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
)(
Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a
)T
Q−1
× (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ) dxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m . (A.38)
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Next, note that∫
p
Z
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−m ,X
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
(
zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−m ,x
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
)(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −M1zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−M2zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m
)T
Q−1
× (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ) dzl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−m dxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
=
∫ (∫
p
Z
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−m |X
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
(
zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−m |xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
)(
zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a −M1zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m−M2zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m
)T
dzl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−m
)
Q−1
× (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ) pXl·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
(
xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
)
dxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
=
∫ (
E
{
Zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a |Xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m =xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
}−M1E{Zl·n+a−1l·n+a−m|Xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m =xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m }
−M2E
{
Zl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a+m |Xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m =xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
})T
Q
−1
(
Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a
)
× p
X
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
(
xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
)
dxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
=
∫ (
Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a
)
Q−1
(
Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a
)T
× p
X
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
(
xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
)
dxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m . (A.39)
Thus, plugging (A.39) into (A.38) results in
I
(
Xb·n+a−1;Zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a
∣∣Zl·n+a−1a ,Z(l+1)·n+a−1l·n+a+m , . . . ,Zb·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,Ua−1a−m)
≤ 1
2
log e ·
∫
p
X
l·n+a+2m−1
l·n+a−2m
(
xl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
)(
Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a
)T
Q−1
× (Gxl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1Gxl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2Gxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a ) dxl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a−2m
=
1
2
log e · E
{(
GXl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1GXl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2GXl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a
)T
Q−1
× (GXl·n+a+m−1l·n+a−m −M1GXl·n+a−1l·n+a−2m−M2GXl·n+a+2m−1l·n+a )
}
. (A.40)
Note that the expression in (A.40) is the mean of a quadratic function of 4m channel inputs, which depends only on
the noise correlation function through Q, the channel transfer function through G, and the power of the input signal.
Consequently, as was shown in (A.32), since the input signal X[i] is subject to a per-symbol power constraint, it
follows that ∃η finite such that I
(
Xb·n+a−1;Zl·n+a+m−1l·n+a
∣∣Zl·n+a−1a ,Z(l+1)·n+a−1l·n+a+m , . . . ,Zb·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,Ua−1a−m) ≤ η. Hence,
the lemma follows.
Lemma A.3. There exists a finite and fixed η˜ > 0, such that for any positive integer n > 2m, and for all initial
states s0 ∈ S0, it holds that
I
(
Xn−1;Ym−1
∣∣Yn−1m ,S0 = s0) ≤ η˜. (A.41)
Proof: Note that
32
I
(
Xn−1;Ym−1
∣∣Yn−1m ,S0=s0)=h(Ym−1∣∣Yn−1m ,S0=s0)−h(Ym−1∣∣Xn−1,Yn−1m ,S0=s0)
(a)
≤ h(Ym−1∣∣S0=s0)−h(Ym−1∣∣Xn−1,Yn−1m ,S0=s0), (A.42)
where (a) follows since conditioning reduces entropy [52, Ch. 8.6]. From the input-output relationship of the
LGMWTC it follows that ∃H1,H0 ∈ R(nr ·m)×(nt·m) such that Ym−1 = H1Xm−1 + H0X−1−m + Wm−1 and
∃Hˇ ∈ R(nr ·(n−m))×(nt·n) such that Yn−1m = HˇXn−1 +Wn−1m . Therefore,
h
(
Ym−1
∣∣Xn−1,Yn−1m ,S0 = s0) = h (H1Xm−1+H0X−1−m +Wm−1∣∣Xn−1,Yn−1m ,S0=s0)
(a)
= h
(
Wm−1
∣∣Xn−1,Wn−1m ,W−1−m = w−1−m)
(b)
= h
(
Wm−1
∣∣Wn−1m ,W−1−m = w−1−m)
(c)
= h
(
Wm−1
∣∣W2m−1m ,W−1−m = w−1−m)
=
∫
w
2m−1
m ∈Rnr·m
h
(
Wm−1
∣∣W2m−1m =w2m−1m ,W−1−m=w−1−m)
× p
W
2m−1
m
(
w2m−1m
)
dw2m−1m , (A.43)
where (a) follows as S0=
[ (
X−1−m
)T
,
(
W−1−m
)T
,
(
U−1−m
)T ]T
; (b) follows since the noise W[i] is independent of
the channel input X[i]; (c) follows since the temporal correlation of the multivariate Gaussian process W[i] is finite
and shorter than m+1, and therefore Wm−1 is independent of Wn−12m . Since Wm−1 and
[(
W2m−1m
)T
,
(
W−1−m
)T ]T
are jointly Gaussian, the conditional distribution Wm−1∣∣W2m−1m = w2m−1m ,W−1−m = w−1−m is a multivariate
Gaussian distribution [59, Proposition 3.13], with covariance matrix Q˜ ∈ R(nrm)×(nrm) given by
Q˜,E
{
Wm−1
(
Wm−1
)T}−E{Wm−1[(W2m−1m )T,(W−1−m)T ]}
×
(
E
{[(
W2m−1m
)T
,
(
W−1−m
)T ]T [(
W2m−1m
)T
,
(
W−1−m
)T ]})−1
×E
{[(
W2m−1m
)T
,
(
W−1−m
)T ]T (
Wm−1
)T}
. (A.44)
We note that as the noise samples are not linearly dependent4, it follows that
∣∣Q˜∣∣ > 0 [57, Ch. 8.1]. Then, from
the differential entropy of a multivariate Gaussian RV [52, Thm. 8.4.1] we conclude that (A.43) can be written as
h
(
Ym−1
∣∣Xn−1,Yn−1m ,S0=s0)= 12 log
(
(2πe)nrm
∣∣Q˜∣∣), (A.45)
where
∣∣Q˜∣∣ is positive, finite, and independent of n. Next, note that
h
(
Ym−1
∣∣S0=s0) =h(H1Xm−1+H0X−1−m+Wm−1∣∣S0=s0)
=h
(
H1X
m−1+Wm−1
∣∣X−1−m=x−1−m,W−1−m=w−1−m) . (A.46)
4Note that for any pair of jointly-Gaussian real-valued random vectors A and B, such that the entries of [AT ,BT ]T are not linearly
dependent, it follows from [58, Ch. 3.5] that the entries of A conditioned on B = b are also not linearly dependent.
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Let KY be the covariance matrix of the conditional distribution H1Xm−1 +Wm−1
∣∣X−1−m = x−1−m,W−1−m =
w−1−m, KX be the covariance matrix of Xm−1, and KW be the covariance matrix of the conditional distribution
Wm−1
∣∣W−1−m = w−1−m. Since the channel input X[i] is subject to a per-symbol power constraint P for i ≥ 0, it
follows that the entries of KX are all not larger than P for any initial state x−1−m. As Wm−1 and W−1−m are jointly
Gaussian, it follows from [59, Proposition 3.13] that KW is independent of the realization of W−1−m, w−1−m. Since
X[i]
∣∣X−1−m,W−1−m d= X[i]∣∣X−1−m and W[i]∣∣X−1−m,W−1−m d=W[i]∣∣W−1−m are mutually independent, and the encoder
is independent of the initial channel state, it follows that KY = H1KXHT1 + KW. As the noise samples are not
linearly dependent, we obtain |KY| > 0 [57, Ch. 8.1]. Defining γk as γk ,
m·nt−1∑
k1=0
m·nt−1∑
k2=0
∣∣∣(H1)k,k2 (H1)k,k1
∣∣∣, it
follows from Hadamard’s inequality [52, Thm. 17.9.2] that
|KY| ≤
m·nr−1∏
k=0
(KY)k,k
=
m·nr−1∏
k=0
((
H1KXH
T
1
)
k,k
+ (KW)k,k
)
=
m·nr−1∏
k=0
(
m·nt−1∑
k1=0
m·nt−1∑
k2=0
(H1)k,k2(KX)k2,k1(H1)k,k1 + (KW)k,k
)
≤
m·nr−1∏
k=0
(
γkP + (KW)k,k
)
.
It follows that |KY| is positive, finite, and independent of n. Plugging (A.45) and (A.46) into (A.42) leads to
I
(
Xn−1;Ym−1
∣∣Yn−1m ,S0 = s0) ≤ h (H1Xm−1 +Wm−1∣∣X−1−m = x−1−m,W−1−m = w−1−m)− 12 log
(
(2πe)nrm
∣∣Q˜∣∣)
(a)
≤ 1
2
log ((2πe)
nrm |KY|)− 1
2
log
(
(2πe)
nrm
∣∣Q˜∣∣) , (A.47)
where (a) follows since h
(
H1X
m−1 +Wm−1
∣∣X−1−m = x−1−m,W−1−m = w−1−m) is upper-bounded by the differential
entropy of an nr ·m× 1 multivariate Gaussian RV with the same covariance matrix [52, Thm. 8.6.5]. It therefore
follows from (A.47) that ∃η˜ independent of n such that I (Xn−1;Ym−1∣∣Yn−1m ,S0 = s0) ≤ η˜.
Comment A.1. Note that the per-symbol power constraint (3) is required in the proofs of Lemmas A.2 and A.3 in
order to upper bound the mutual information between a transmitted block of b·n+a channel inputs (for Lemma A.2)
or n channel inputs (for Lemma A.3) and a received block of m channel outputs, by a finite quantity independent
of n. Consequently, the per-symbol constraint is essential for proving the asymptotic secrecy capacity equivalence
stated in Proposition 1.
Lemma A.4. The secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC satisfies Cs ≤ inf
s0∈S0
(
lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s0)
)
.
Proof: We prove the lemma by showing that every secrecy rate Rs achievable for the LGMWTC satisfies
Rs ≤ lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s0) for any initial state s0. By definition, if Rs is achievable for the LGMWTC, then for every
non-negative triplet ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 > 0 and for all sufficiently large n there exists an [R, n] code, such that (4a)-(4c) are
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satisfied. Fix S0 = s˜0, and recall that from Fano’s inequality [52, Sec. 2.10] it follows that
H
(
M |Yn−1,S0 = s˜0
) ≤ 1 + Pr(M 6= Mˆ ∣∣∣S0 = s˜0) · nR
(a)
≤ 1 + ǫ1 · nR, (A.48)
where (a) follows from (4a) since Pr
(
M 6= Mˆ
∣∣∣S0 = s˜0) ≤ sup
s0∈S0
Pr
(
M 6= Mˆ
∣∣∣S0 = s0) ≤ ǫ1. Therefore,
I
(
M ;Yn−1
∣∣S0= s˜0)−I (M ;Zn−1∣∣S0= s˜0) = H (M |S0= s˜0)−H (M |Yn−1,S0= s˜0)−I (M ;Zn−1∣∣S0= s˜0)
(a)
≥ H (M |S0 = s˜0)− 1− ǫ1 · nR− ǫ2 · n
(b)
= nR− 1− ǫ1 · nR− ǫ2 · n, (A.49)
where (a) follows from (A.48) and from (4b), as I(M ;Zn−1∣∣S0 = s˜0)≤ sup
s0∈S0
I
(
M ;Zn−1
∣∣S0 = s0) < ǫ2 · n;
and (b) follows since M is uniformly distributed and is independent of S0. Combining (4c) and (A.49) leads to
(1− ǫ1) (Rs − ǫ3)− 1
n
− ǫ2 ≤ 1
n
(
I
(
M ;Yn−1
∣∣S0 = s˜0)− I (M ;Zn−1∣∣S0 = s˜0)
)
(a)
≤ 1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1
∣∣S0 = s˜0)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1∣∣S0 = s˜0)
}
≡ Cn (˜s0) , (A.50)
where (a) follows since we can define a pair
(
Vn−1,Xn−1
)
such that Vn−1 is a random variable representing
the uniformly distributed message M and p
(
Xn−1|Vn−1) is defined by the encoder of the [R, n] code (either
deterministic or stochastic), as done in the proof of [29, Lemma 4]. Since (A.50) holds for all sufficiently large n,
it follows from [43, Thm. 3.19] that lim inf
n→∞
(
(1− ǫ1) (Rs − ǫ3)− 1n − ǫ2
) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s˜0), thus
(1− ǫ1) (Rs − ǫ3)− ǫ2 ≤ lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s˜0) . (A.51)
Since ǫ1, ǫ2, and ǫ3 can also be made arbitrarily small, (A.51) implies that
Rs ≤ lim inf
n→∞
Cn (˜s0) , (A.52)
and as (A.52) is true for any achievable secrecy rate Rs, we conclude that for all s˜0 ∈ S0, Cs ≤ lim inf
n→∞
Cn (˜s0)
5
,
thus Cs ≤ inf
s0∈S0
(
lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s0)
)
.
Lemma A.5. Cn−MGs , defined in (A.1), satisfies inf
s0∈S0
(
lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s0)
)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
Cn−MGs .
5As the supremum is defined as the least upper bound [43, Def. 1.8], it follows that if every achievable secrecy rate Rs is not larger than a
given real number γ ∈ R, then the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates, Cs, is also not larger than γ.
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Proof: First, we show that for all s0 ∈ S0, Cn (s0) ≤ Cn−MGs + η˜n . Note that
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1
∣∣S0=s0) (a)= I (Vn−1;Yn−1m ∣∣S0=s0)+I (Vn−1;Ym−1∣∣Yn−1m ,S0=s0)
(b)
≤ I (Vn−1;Yn−1m ∣∣S0=s0)+I (Xn−1;Ym−1∣∣Yn−1m ,S0=s0)
(c)
≤ I (Vn−1;Yn−1m ∣∣S0=s0)+η˜
(d)
= I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)
+ η˜, (A.53)
where (a) follows from the mutual information chain rule [52, Sec. 2.5]; (b) follows from the data processing
inequality and the Markov chain6 Vn−1|S0 → Xn−1|S0 → Yn−1|S0; (c) follows from Lemma A.3; and (d)
follows since Y[i] is independent of the initial state ∀i ≥ m. Using (A.53) in the definition of Cn (s0) in (A.20)
we obtain
Cn (s0)
(a)
≤ 1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)
+ η˜ − I (Vn−1;Zn−1∣∣S0 = s0)
}
(b)
≤ 1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1m ∣∣S0 = s0)
}
+
1
n
η˜
(c)
=
1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1m )
}
+
1
n
η˜
≡ Cn−MGs +
η˜
n
,
where (a) follows from (A.53); (b) follows from the non-negativity of the mutual information which implies that
I
(
Vn−1;Zn−1m
∣∣S0 = s0) ≤ I (Vn−1;Zn−1∣∣S0 = s0); and (c) follows since Z[i] is independent of the initial
state ∀i ≥ m.
Now, since for all s0 ∈ S0, Cn (s0) ≤ Cn−MGs + η˜n , then lim infn→∞ Cn (s0)≤ lim infn→∞ C
n−MG
s , therefore,
inf
s0∈S0
(
lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s0)
)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
Cn−MGs .
This proves the lemma.
Lemma A.6. Cn−MGs , defined in (A.1), satisfies lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs ≤ Cs.
6The Markov chain Vn−1|S0 → Xn−1|S0 → Yn−1|S0 is a short notation for the relationship p
(
Vn−1,Xn−1,Yn−1
∣∣S0 = s0
)
=
p
(
Vn−1
∣∣S0 = s0
)
p
(
Xn−1
∣∣Vn−1,S0 = s0
)
p
(
Yn−1
∣∣Xn−1, S0 = s0
)
, for all s0 ∈ S0, see, e.g., [64].
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Proof: In order to prove the lemma we show that every non-negative Rs < lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs is an achievable
secrecy rate for the LGMWTC7 To that aim, consider such Rs < lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs : From [60, Thm. 5.5] it follows
that if Rs < lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs , then there are infinitely many values of n ∈ N such that Rs ≤ Cn−MGs , hence, Rs
is an achievable secrecy rate for the n-MGMWTC for these values of n. Consequently, it follows that for a given
real number η > 0 and for any arbitrarily fixed non-negative triplet ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 > 0, ∃n > n1 ,
⌈
2η
ǫ2
⌉
such that Rs
is an achievable secrecy rate for the n-MGMWTC. Note that since n > n1 it follows that ǫ2 − 2ηn > 0. By Def. 4,
the achievability of Rs implies that we can find a sufficiently large b0 ∈ N, such that for all integer b > b0 there
exists an [R1, b · n] code for the n-MGMWTC which satisfies
sup
s0∈S0
P b·ne (s0)
(a)
= P b·ne ≤ ǫ1, (A.54a)
sup
s0∈S0
1
b · nI
(
M ;Zn−1m ,Z
2n−1
n+m , . . . ,Z
b·n−1
(b−1)·n+m
∣∣∣S0 = s0) (b)= 1
b · nI
(
M ;Zn−1m ,Z
2n−1
n+m , . . . ,Z
b·n−1
(b−1)·n+m
)
≤ ǫ2 − 2η
n
, (A.54b)
and
R1 ≥ Rs − ǫ3
2
, (A.54c)
where (a) and (b) follow since the n-MGMWTC is n-block memoryless, hence, the channel outputs and the
probability of error are independent of the initial state, when the length of the codeword is an integer multiple of
n. Denote this code by CMGb·n , and recall that from the definition of the n-MGMWTC, it follows that the decoders
at the intended receiver and at the eavesdropper use only the last n −m channel outputs out of each block of n
consecutive channel outputs of the LGMWTC. Let Xb·n−1MG denote the codeword of length b ·n used for transmitting
a message ζ ∈M via the code CMGb·n for the n-MGMWTC.
Next, based on the code CMGb·n , we construct a code for the LGMWTC with codeword length l = b · n + a,
where a can be selected arbitrarily from a ∈ {m,m+1, . . . , n+m− 1}. We denote this code by CLGl , and in the
following we analyze the performance of CLGl . In the analysis we use Y¯[i] and Z¯[i] to denote the channel outputs
of the LGMWTC at the intended receiver and at the eavesdropper, respectively, when the code CLGl is employed.
The encoder of the CLGl code encodes the message ζ ∈M into the codeword Xl−1LG by setting Xa−1LG = 0a·nt×1 and
setting Xl−1LG,a to be equal to the codeword used for transmitting ζ using the CMGb·n code, i.e., Xl−1LG,a = Xb·n−1MG for
the same message ζ. The decoder of the CLGl code discards the first a channel outputs of the codeword, and then
discards the first m channel outputs of each block of n channel outputs. The remaining channel outputs, namely
Y¯LG ,
(
Y¯n+a−1a+m , Y¯
2n+a−1
n+a+m , . . . , Y¯
b·n+a−1
(b−1)·n+a+m
)
, are then used for decoding the message using the decoder for
the CMGb·n code.
7Note that if every non-negative Rs < lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs satisfies Rs ≤ Cs, then necessarily, lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs ≤ Cs. This follows since
if lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs > Cs then ∃R˜s, such that Cs < R˜s < lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs , i.e., R˜s does not satisfy out initial assumption.
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Define
YMG ,
(
Yn−1m ,Y
2n−1
n+m , . . . ,Y
b·n−1
(b−1)·n+m
)
,
and
Wa ,
(
Wn+a−1a+m ,W
2n+a−1
n+a+m , . . . ,W
b·n+a−1
(b−1)·n+a+m
)
.
It follows from the definition of the LGMWTC that ∃H¯ ∈ Rnr ·b·(n−m)×nt·b·n such that Y¯LG = H¯Xl−1LG,a +
Wa and also YMG = H¯Xb·n−1MG + W0. It now follows from the stationarity of W[i] and the relationship
between CLGl and CMGb·n that the decoder for the CLGl code operates on channel outputs which have the same
statistical characterization as the channel outputs YMG, which result from transmitting codewords using the
CMGb·n code. Hence, the probability of error for the code CLGl is identical to that for the code CMGb·n . Simi-
larly, by defining Z¯LG,
(
Z¯n+a−1a+m , Z¯
2n+a−1
n+a+m , . . . , Z¯
b·n+a−1
(b−1)·n+a+m
)
, ZMG ,
(
Zn−1m ,Z
2n−1
n+m , . . . ,Z
b·n−1
(b−1)·n+m
)
and Ua,(
Un+a−1a+m ,U
2n+a−1
n+a+m , . . . ,U
b·n+a−1
(b−1)·n+a+m
)
, it follows that ∃G¯ ∈ Rne·b·(n−m)×nt·b·n such that Z¯LG = G¯Xl−1LG,a +Ua
and also ZMG = G¯Xb·n−1MG +U0, which implies that Z¯LG and ZMG both have the same statistical characterization.
Consequently,
I (M ;ZMG)
(a)
= I
(
M,Xb·n−1MG ;ZMG
)− I (Xb·n−1MG ;ZMG∣∣M)
(b)
= I
(
Xb·n−1MG ;ZMG
)− I (Xb·n−1MG ;ZMG∣∣M)
(c)
= I
(
Xl−1LG,a; Z¯LG
)
− I
(
Xl−1LG,a; Z¯LG
∣∣∣M)
(d)
= I
(
M ; Z¯LG
)
, (A.55)
where (a) follows from the chain rule for mutual information [52, Ch. 2.5]; (b) follows since M → Xb·n−1MG → ZMG
form a Markov chain; (c) follows from the combination of the following three properties: (1) the stationarity of
U[i]; (2) the definition of the encoder of the CLGl code; (3) the fact that the channel matrix G¯ is identical for
both the LGMWTC and the n-MGMWTC, which imply that the joint distribution of (Xb·n−1MG ,ZMG) is identical
to the joint distribution of
(
Xl−1LG,a, Z¯LG
)
, and also implies that the joint distribution of (Xb·n−1MG ,ZMG) given M
is identical to the joint distribution of
(
Xl−1LG,a, Z¯LG
)
given M ; and (d) follows from the construction of the CLGl
code, which sets Xa−1LG to be the all zero vector, and by applying the reverse of the transition from (a) to (b).
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Next, let Z¯l−1 denote the entire set of l vector channel outputs obtained when transmitting using the code CLGl .
When this transmission is applied, the information leakage rate for the LGMWTC satisfies
sup
s0∈S0
1
l
I
(
M ; Z¯l−1
∣∣S0 = s0) = sup
s0∈S0
1
b · n+ aI
(
M ; Z¯b·n+a−1
∣∣S0 = s0)
(a)
= sup
s0∈S0
1
b · n+ a
(
I
(
M ; Z¯
a−1
∣∣∣S0 = s0)
+ I
(
M ; Z¯b·n+a−1a
∣∣ Z¯a−1,S0 = s0)
)
(b)
= sup
s0∈S0
1
b · n+ aI
(
M ; Z¯b·n+a−1a
∣∣ Z¯a−1,S0 = s0)
(c)
= sup
s0∈S0
1
b · n+ aI
(
M ; Z¯b·n+a−1a
∣∣Ua−1,S0 = s0)
(d)
=
1
b · n+ aI
(
M ; Z¯b·n+a−1a
∣∣Ua−1a−m) , (A.56)
where (a) follows from the chain rule for mutual information [52, Ch. 2.5]; (b) follows since when using the code
CLGl , the first a channel outputs depend only on the initial state and the noise, hence, M and Z¯a−1 are mutually
independent; (c) follows since Xa−1LG is all zeros, thus ∃Gˇ ∈ Rne·a×nt·m such that Z¯a−1 = GˇX−1−m +Ua−1; (d)
follows since the finite memory of the channel implies that Z¯b·n+a−1a is independent of the initial state and of
Ua−m−1, regardless of the code. This can be shown by noting that we can define a matrix ˇˇG ∈ Rne·b·n×nt(b·n+m)
such that Z¯b·n+a−1a =
ˇˇ
GXb·n+a−1LG,a−m +U
b·n+a−1
a , and noting that XLG[i] is independent of both Ua−m−1 and S0
for all a ≤ i ≤ b · n + a − 1, and that, due to the finite memory of the noise, then for all i ≥ a ≥ m U[i] is
independent of both S0 as well as Ua−m−1. Next, we note that 1b·nI
(
M ; Z¯
b·n+a−1
a
∣∣∣Ua−1a−m) can be upper bounded
as stated in (A.57), where (a) follows from the chain rule for mutual information [52, Ch. 2.5]; (b) follows from the
data-processing inequality [52, Ch. 2.8]; (c) follows from Lemma A.2, and from the finite memory of the channel
which implies that for i ≥ a+m, Z¯[i] is independent of Ua−1a−m; (d) follows from (A.55); (e) follows from (A.54b).
Plugging (A.57) into (A.56) yields
sup
s0∈S0
1
l
I
(
M ; Z¯l−1
∣∣S0 = s0) ≤ b · n
b · n+ a
(
ǫ2 − η
n
)
≤ ǫ2.
The code rate for CLGl is obtained from
RLG = R1 · b · n
b · n+ a
(a)
≥
(
Rs − ǫ3
2
) b · n
b · n+ a ,
where (a) follows from (A.54c). Thus, for sufficiently large b, namely, b > 2a(Rs−ǫ3)
n·ǫ3
, it follows that RLG ≥ Rs−ǫ3.
It therefore follows that for all sufficiently large b and a ∈ {m,m + 1, . . . , n + m − 1}, there exists a code
for the LGMWTC with blocklength l = b · n + a which satisfies (4a)-(4c). Consequently, for any secrecy rate
Rs ≤ lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs , ∃l0 ∈ N large enough such that reliable secure communications is achievable for the
LGMWTC at any rate arbitrarily close to Rs, for all blocklengths larger than l0. Thus, Rs ≤ Cs, from which it
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1b · nI
(
M ; Z¯
b·n+a−1
a
∣∣∣Ua−1a−m)
(a)
=
1
b · nI
(
M ; Z¯n+a−1a+m , Z¯
2n+a−1
n+a+m , . . . , Z¯
b·n+a−1
(b−1)·n+a+m
∣∣∣Ua−1a−m)
+
1
b · n
(
I
(
M ; Z¯a+m−1a
∣∣ Z¯n+a−1a+m , Z¯2n+a−1n+a+m , . . . , Z¯b·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,Ua−1a−m)
+
b−1∑
k=1
I
(
M ; Z¯k·n+a+m−1k·n+a
∣∣ Z¯n+a−1a+m , Z¯2n+a−1n+a+m , . . . , Z¯b·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,
Z¯a+m−1a , Z¯
n+a+m−1
n+a , . . . , Z¯
(k−1)·n+a+m−1
(k−1)·n+a ,U
a−1
a−m
))
(b)
≤ 1
b · nI
(
M ; Z¯n+a−1a+m , Z¯
2n+a−1
n+a+m , . . . , Z¯
b·n+a−1
(b−1)·n+a+m
∣∣∣Ua−1a−m)
+
1
b · n
(
I
(
Xb·n+a−1LG ; Z¯
a+m−1
a
∣∣ Z¯n+a−1a+m , Z¯2n+a−1n+a+m , . . . , Z¯b·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,Ua−1a−m)
+
b−1∑
k=1
I
(
Xb·n+a−1LG ; Z¯
k·n+a+m−1
k·n+a
∣∣ Z¯n+a−1a+m , Z¯2n+a−1n+a+m , . . . , Z¯b·n+a−1(b−1)·n+a+m,
Z¯a+m−1a , Z¯
n+a+m−1
n+a , . . . , Z¯
(k−1)·n+a+m−1
(k−1)·n+a ,U
a−1
a−m
))
(c)
≤ 1
b · nI
(
M ; Z¯n+a−1a+m , Z¯
2n+a−1
n+a+m , . . . , Z¯
b·n+a−1
(b−1)·n+a+m
)
+
η
n
(d)
=
1
b · nI
(
M ;Zn−1m ,Z
2n−1
n+m , . . . ,Z
b·n−1
(b−1)·n+m
)
+
η
n
(e)
≤ ǫ2− η
n
, (A.57)
follows that lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs ≤ Cs.
Comment A.2. Note that without an eavesdropper, the n-MGMWTC becomes an instance to the n-block memo-
ryless Gaussian multiterminal channel (n-MGMC), defined in [33, Appendix A], and the LGMWTC becomes an
instance to the linear Gaussian multiterminal channel (LGMC), defined in [33, Appendix A]. In [33, Lemma 2] it
is shown that the capacity of the n-MGMC is not greater than the capacity of the LGMC for all n > 2m. However,
when the eavesdropper is present, the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC can be shown to be upper-bounded
by that of the LGMWTC only for n→ ∞, as the information leakage due to the first m channel outputs of each
n-block received at the eavesdropper, which are not accounted for in the leakage model of the n-MGMWTC, is
negligible only for asymptotic blocklengths with n→∞.
Proposition A.2. The secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC defined in (2) subject to the power constraint in (3) satisfies
Cs = lim
n→∞
Cn−MGs ,
where Cn−MGs is the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC, which is stated in (A.1), and the limit exists.
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Proof: By combining the above lemmas it follows that
lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs
(a)
≤ Cs
(b)
≤ inf
s0∈S0
(
lim inf
n→∞
Cn (s0)
)
(c)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
Cn−MGs ,
where (a) follows from Lemma A.6, (b) follows from Lemma A.4, and (c) follows from Lemma A.5. Since
lim inf
n→∞
Cn−MGs ≤ lim sup
n→∞
Cn−MGs , it follows from [43, Sec. 3.18] that
Cs = lim
n→∞
Cn−MGs ,
and the limit exists. This proves the proposition.
C. Proving that lim
n→∞
Cn−MGs is Equal to lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs
We next prove that in the limit of n → ∞, the n-CGMWTC and the n-MGMWTC have the same secrecy
capacity. This is done in the following steps:
• First, we obtain in Lemma A.7 an expression for the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC, Cn−CGs , by proving
that it can be transformed into an equivalent memoryless MIMO WTC.
• Next, in Lemma A.8 we prove that for a single n-block, the mutual information between the channel input
and the last n−m channel outputs is the same for both the n-CGMWTC and the n-MGMWTC.
• Then, we show in Lemma A.9 that the mutual information between the channel inputs and any m channel
outputs of the n-CGMWTC can be upper bounded by a fixed and finite number.
• Lastly, in Proposition A.3 we use Lemma A.7, Lemma A.8, and Lemma A.9 to prove that there exists a finite
˜
η, such that ∀n > 2m, Cn−MGs − ˜
η
n
≤ Cn−CGs ≤ Cn−MGs + ˜
η
n
, thus in the limit of n→∞, Cn−MGs is equal
to Cn−CGs .
Lemma A.7. The secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to the power constraint in (3) is given by
Cn−CGs =
1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1
)− I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1
)}
. (A.58)
Proof: The proof of this lemma follows the same outline as in the proof of Proposition A.1. We first show
that (A.58) characterizes the maximum achievable secrecy rate when considering only codes whose blocklength
is an integer multiple of n, i.e, [R, b · n] codes where b is a positive integer. This is proved by transforming the
n-CGMWTC into an equivalent memoryless MIMO WTC using a bijective transformation, and then characterizing
the capacity of the transformed channel. Then, we show that every secrecy rate achievable for the n-CGMWTC
can be achieved by considering only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n.
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Let us consider the n-CGMWTC subject to the constraint that only codes with blocklengths that are integer
multiples of n are allowed. In this case we can transform the channel into an equivalent n · nt × n · nr × n · ne
memoryless MIMO wiretap channel without loss of information, via the following assignment: Define the input
of the transformed channel by the n · nt × 1 vector Xeq
[
i˜
]
, X
(i˜+1)·n−1
i˜·n
, i˜ ≥ 0, the output at the intended
receiver by the n ·nr× 1 vector
˜
Yeq
[
i˜
]
,
˜
Y
(i˜+1)·n−1
i˜·n
, and the output at the eavesdropper by the n ·ne× 1 vector
˜
Zeq
[
i˜
]
,
˜
Z
(˜i+1)·n−1
i˜·n
. The transformation is clearly bijective thus, the secrecy capacity of the transformed channel
is equal to the secrecy capacity of the original channel. Since the n-CGMWTC is n-block memoryless, it follows
from Def. 6 and Def. 7 that the transformed MIMO channel is memoryless. The outputs at the intended receiver and
at the eavesdropper are corrupted by the additive noise vectors
˜
Weq
[
i˜
]
,
˜
W
(˜i+1)·n−1
i˜·n
and
˜
Ueq
[
i˜
]
,
˜
U
(i˜+1)·n−1
i˜·n
,
respectively. From the definition of
˜
W[i] and
˜
U[i] in Section III it follows that both
˜
Weq
[
i˜
]
and
˜
Ueq
[
i˜
]
are zero-
mean real Gaussian vectors with positive-definite covariance matrices (this follows since the elements of the random
vectors are not linearly dependent, see [57, Ch. 8.1]). From the construction of the transformed equivalent channel,
the definition of the noises for the n-CGMWTC in the proof outline of Thm. 1, and of block-memorylessness in
Def. 7, it follows that both
˜
Weq
[
i˜
]
and
˜
Ueq
[
i˜
]
are i.i.d. and mutually independent. The secrecy capacity of the
transformed channel, denoted Ceqn , can be written in the form of the result of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2, Eq. (11)]:
Ceqn = sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1
)− I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1
)}
,
where the constraint E
{
‖X[i]‖2
}
≤ P, ∀0 ≤ i < n follows from the per-symbol power constraint of the n-
CGMWTC. As each MIMO channel use corresponds to n channel uses in the original channel, it follows that the
achievable secrecy rate of the n-CGMWTC, subject to the constraint that only codes with blocklengths that are
integer multiples of n are allowed, in bits per channel use, is 1
n
Ceqn , which coincides with (A.58).
Next, we show that any secrecy rate achievable for the n-CGMWTC can be achieved by considering only codes
with blocklengths that are integer multiples of n: Consider a secrecy rate Rs achievable for the n-CGMWTC and
fix ǫ1, ǫ2, and ǫ3 to arbitrary positive real numbers. From Def. 4 it follows that ∃n0 > 0 such that ∀l > n0 there
exists an [R, l] code which satisfies (4a)-(4c). Thus, by setting b0 as the smallest integer such that b0 · n ≥ n0 it
follows that for all integer b > b0 there exists a [R, b · n] code which satisfies (4a)-(4c). Therefore, the secrecy rate
Rs is also achievable when considering only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n. We therefore
conclude that (A.58) denotes the maximum achievable secrecy rate for the n-CGMWTC, which completes the proof
of the lemma.
Lemma A.8. For any joint distribution p (Vn−1,Xn−1) such that Vn−1 → Xn−1 → Yn−1m ,Zn−1m and Vn−1 →
Xn−1 →
˜
Yn−1m ,
˜
Zn−1m form a Markov chain, the channel outputs of the n-MGMWTC and of the n-CGMWTC
satisfy
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)
= I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1m
)
, (A.59a)
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and
I
(
Vn−1;Zn−1m
)
= I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1m
)
. (A.59b)
Proof: It follows from (2) and (8) that ∃
˜
H ∈ R(nr·(n−m))×(nt·n) such that Yn−1m =
˜
HXn−1 + Wn−1m and
˜
Yn−1m =
˜
HXn−1+
˜
Wn−1m . Hence, as the channel input Xn−1 is independent of the noise in both channels it follows
that
p
Y
n−1
m |Xn−1
(
yn−1m
∣∣xn−1) =p
W
n−1
m
(
yn−1m −
˜
Hxn−1
)
(a)
= p
˜
W
n−1
m
(
yn−1m −
˜
Hxn−1
)
=p
˜
Y
n−1
m |Xn−1
(
yn−1m
∣∣xn−1) , (A.60)
where (a) follows as, by definition, the random vectors Wn−1m and
˜
Wn−1m are identically distributed, as both are zero-
mean real Gaussian random vectors with the same correlation matrix: To see this, the ∀i1, i2 ∈ {m,m+1, . . . , n−1}
we write
E
{
˜
W[i1]
˜
WH [i2]
}
= C
˜
W [i1 − i2]
= CW [i1 − i2] + CW [i1 − i2 + n] + CW [i1 − i2 − n]
(b)
= CW [i1 − i2]
= E
{
W[i1]W
H [i2]
}
,
where (b) follows from (7a) as |i1 − i2| < n−m. It therefore follows that
p
Vn−1,Y
n−1
m
(
vn−1,yn−1m
)
=
∫
xn−1∈Rnt·n
p
Vn−1,Xn−1,Y
n−1
m
(
vn−1,xn−1,yn−1m
)
dxn−1
(a)
=
∫
xn−1∈Rn
p
Y
n−1
m |Xn−1
(
yn−1m
∣∣xn−1) pVn−1,Xn−1 (vn−1,xn−1) dxn−1
(b)
=
∫
xn−1∈Rnt·n
p
˜
Y
n−1
m |Xn−1
(
yn−1m
∣∣xn−1) pVn−1,Xn−1 (vn−1,xn−1) dxn−1
(c)
=
∫
xn−1∈Rnt·n
p
Vn−1,Xn−1,
˜
Y
n−1
m
(
vn−1,xn−1,yn−1m
)
dxn−1
= p
Vn−1,
˜
Y
n−1
m
(
vn−1,yn−1m
)
, (A.61)
where (a) follows since Vn−1 → Xn−1 → Yn−1m form a Markov chain; (b) follows from (A.60); and (c) follows
since Vn−1 → Xn−1 →
˜
Yn−1m form a Markov chain. Equality (A.61) directly leads to (A.59a). The proof of
(A.59b) is obtained using similar steps with the letters Y and W in the derivations of (A.60) and (A.61) replaced
by Z and U , respectively. This completes the proof of the lemma.
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Lemma A.9. There exists a finite and fixed
˜
η > 0, such that the channel outputs of the n-CGMWTC satisfy
I
(
Xn−1;
˜
Ym−1
∣∣
˜
Yn−1m
) ≤
˜
η, (A.62a)
and
I
(
Xn−1;
˜
Zm−1
∣∣
˜
Zn−1m
) ≤
˜
η. (A.62b)
Proof: Note that
I
(
Xn−1;
˜
Ym−1
∣∣
˜
Yn−1m
)
= h
(
˜
Ym−1
∣∣
˜
Yn−1m
)− h (
˜
Ym−1
∣∣Xn−1,
˜
Yn−1m
)
, (A.63)
where
h
(
˜
Ym−1
∣∣Xn−1,
˜
Yn−1m
) (a)
= h
(
˜
Wm−1
∣∣Xn−1,
˜
Wn−1m
)
(b)
= h
(
˜
Wm−1
∣∣
˜
Wn−1m
)
(c)
= h
(
˜
Wm−1
∣∣
˜
W2m−1m ,
˜
Wn−1n−m
)
=
∫
(w2m−1m ,wn−1n−m)∈Rnr·2m
h
(
˜
Wm−1
∣∣
˜
W2m−1m =
˜
w2m−1m ,
˜
Wn−1n−m=
˜
wn−1n−m
)
× p
˜
W
2m−1
m ,
˜
W
n−1
n−m
(
˜
w2m−1m ,
˜
wn−1n−m
)
d
˜
w2m−1m d
˜
wn−1n−m, (A.64)
where (a) follows since ∃
˜
Hˇ ∈ R(nr ·m)×(nt·n) such that
˜
Ym−1 =
˜
HˇXn−1 +
˜
Wm−1, and ∃
˜
H¨ ∈ R(nr·(n−m))×(nt·n)
such that
˜
Yn−1m =
˜
H¨Xn−1 +
˜
Wn−1m ; (b) follows since the noise
˜
W[i] is independent of the channel input Xn−1;
(c) follows since the finite temporal correlation of the multivariate Gaussian process
˜
W[i] is circular, finite, and
smaller than m+ 1, which implies that
˜
Wm−1 is mutually independent of
˜
Wn−m−12m .
Since
˜
Wm−1 and
[(
˜
W2m−1m
)T
,
(
˜
Wn−1n−m
)T ]T
are jointly Gaussian, the conditional distribution
˜
Wm−1
∣∣
˜
W2m−1m =
˜
w2m−1m ,
˜
Wn−1n−m =
˜
wn−1n−m is a multivariate Gaussian distribution [59, Proposition 3.13] with covariance matrix
˜
Q , E
{
˜
Wm−1
(
˜
Wm−1
)T}−E{
˜
Wm−1
[(
˜
W2m−1m
)T
,
(
˜
Wn−1n−m
)T ]}(
E
{[(
˜
W2m−1m
)T
,
(
˜
Wn−1n−m
)T ]T
×
[(
˜
W2m−1m
)T
,
(
˜
Wn−1n−m
)T ]})−1
E
{[(
˜
W2m−1m
)T
,
(
˜
Wn−1n−m
)T ]T (
˜
Wm−1
)T}
. (A.65)
Since the noise samples are not linearly dependent, it follows that
∣∣
˜
Q
∣∣ > 0 [57, Ch. 8.1]. Using the expression for
the differential entropy of a multivariate Gaussian RV [52, Thm. 8.4.1] we obtain that (A.64) can be written as
h
(
˜
Ym−1
∣∣Xn−1,
˜
Yn−1m
)
=
1
2
log
(
(2πe)
m
∣∣
˜
Q
∣∣) . (A.66)
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Plugging (A.66) into (A.63) leads to
I
(
Xn−1;
˜
Ym−1
∣∣
˜
Yn−1m
)
= h
(
˜
Ym−1
∣∣
˜
Yn−1m
)− 1
2
log
(
(2πe)
m
∣∣
˜
Q
∣∣)
(a)
≤ h (
˜
Ym−1
)− 1
2
log
(
(2πe)
m
∣∣
˜
Q
∣∣) , (A.67)
where (a) follows since conditioning reduces entropy [52, Ch. 8.6]. Define
˜
Xm−1n−m ,
[(
Xn−1n−m
)T
,
(
Xm−1
)T ]T
.
From the input-output relationship of the n-CGMWTC it follows that ∃
˜
H1 ∈ R(nr ·m)×(nt·2·m) such that
˜
Ym−1 =
˜
H1
˜
Xm−1n−m +
˜
Wm−1. Let K
˜
Y be the covariance matrix of
˜
Ym−1, K
˜
X be the covariance matrix of
˜
Xm−1n−m, and K
˜
W
be the covariance matrix of
˜
Wm−1. Since the channel input X[i], i ≥ 0, is subject to a per-symbol power constraint
P , it follows that the entries of K
˜
X are all not larger than P . Since X[i] and W[i] are mutually independent, it
follows that K
˜
Y =
˜
H1K
˜
X
˜
HT1 + K
˜
W, and since the noise samples are not linearly dependent, we obtain
∣∣K
˜
Y
∣∣ > 0
[57, Ch. 8.1]. Define
˜
γk ,
2·m·nt−1∑
k1=0
2·m·nt−1∑
k2=0
∣∣∣(
˜
H1)k,k2 (˜
H1)k,k1
∣∣∣. It follows from Hadamard’s inequality [52, Thm.
17.9.2] that
∣∣K
˜
Y
∣∣ ≤ m·nr−1∏
k=0
(
K
˜
Y
)
k,k
=
m·nr−1∏
k=0
((
˜
H1K
˜
X
˜
HT1
)
k,k
+
(
K
˜
W
)
k,k
)
=
m·nr−1∏
k=0
(
2·m·nt−1∑
k1=0
2·m·nt−1∑
k2=0
(
˜
H1)k,k2
(
K
˜
X
)
k2,k1
(
˜
H1)k,k1 +
(
K
˜
W
)
k,k
)
≤
m·nr−1∏
k=0
(
˜
γkP +
(
K
˜
W
)
k,k
)
.
It follows that
∣∣K
˜
Y
∣∣ is positive, finite, and independent of n. Since h (
˜
Ym−1
)
is upper-bounded by the differential
entropy of an nr ·m × 1 multivariate Gaussian RV with the same covariance matrix [52, Thm. 8.6.5], it follows
from (A.67) that
I
(
Xn−1;
˜
Ym−1
∣∣
˜
Yn−1m
) ≤ 1
2
log
(
(2πe)
m
∣∣K
˜
Y
∣∣)− 1
2
log
(
(2πe)
m
∣∣
˜
Q
∣∣) , (A.68)
From (A.68) we conclude ∃
˜
η independent of n such that I
(
Xn−1;
˜
Ym−1
∣∣
˜
Yn−1m
) ≤
˜
η. The proof of (A.62b) is
obtained using similar steps with the letters Y and W in the derivation leading to (A.68) are replaced by Z and
U , respectively. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proposition A.3. The secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC and the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC satisfy
lim
n→∞
Cn−MGs = lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs , (A.69)
and the limits exist.
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Proof: It follows from the mutual information chain rule [52, Sec. 2.5] that
I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1
)
= I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1m
)
+ I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Ym−1
∣∣
˜
Yn−1m
)
(a)
≤ I (Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1m
)
+ I
(
Xn−1;
˜
Ym−1
∣∣
˜
Yn−1m
)
(b)
≤ I (Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1m
)
+
˜
η, (A.70a)
where (a) follows from the data processing inequality [52, Thm. 2.8.1] and the Markov chain Vn−1 → Xn−1 →
˜
Yn−1,
˜
Zn−1, and (b) follows from Lemma A.9. Similarly,
I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1
) ≤ I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1m
)
+
˜
η. (A.70b)
Now, for any given joint distribution p (Vn−1,Xn−1), it follows from (A.70a) that
I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1
)− I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1
) ≤ I (Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1m
)
+
˜
η − I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1
)
(a)
≤ I (Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1m
)
+
˜
η
(b)
= I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1m )+
˜
η, (A.71)
where (a) follows from the chain rule for mutual information [52, Sec. 2.5] and the fact that mutual information
is non-negative; (b) follows from Lemma A.8. From Lemma A.7 it follows that
Cn−CGs =
1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1
)− I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1
)}
(a)
≤ 1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1m )
}
+ ˜
η
n
= Cn−MGs + ˜
η
n
, (A.72)
where (a) follows from (A.71).
Next, for any given p
(
Vn−1,Xn−1
)
, we also have the following relationship
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1m ) (a)= I (Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1m
)
(b)
≤ I (Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1
)
+
˜
η
(c)
≤ I (Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1
)− I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1
)
+
˜
η, (A.73)
where (a) follows from Lemma A.8; (b) follows from (A.70b); (c) follows from the chain rule for mutual information
[52, Sec. 2.5] and as mutual information is non-negative which implies that I (Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1
) ≥ I (Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1m
)
.
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From the definition of Cn−MGs in (A.1) it follows that
Cn−MGs =
1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;Yn−1m
)− I (Vn−1;Zn−1m )
}
(a)
≤ 1
n
sup
p(Vn−1,Xn−1):
E{‖X[i]‖2}≤P, ∀0≤i<n
{
I
(
Vn−1;
˜
Yn−1
)− I (Vn−1;
˜
Zn−1
)}
+ ˜
η
n
= Cn−CGs + ˜
η
n
, (A.74)
where (a) follows from (A.73). Combining (A.72) and (A.74) yields
Cn−MGs − ˜
η
n
≤ Cn−CGs ≤ Cn−MGs + ˜
η
n
. (A.75)
Since lim
n→∞
˜
η
n
= 0, and since lim
n→∞
Cn−MGs = Cs exists, letting n→∞ in (A.75) proves the proposition.
Combining Propositions A.2 and A.3 proves Proposition 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Recall that the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to the per-symbol power constraint (3), is denoted
by Cn−CGs . In order to derive the expression in (10) for Cn−CGs , we first derive the secrecy capacity of the
n-CGMWTC subject to the time-averaged power constraint [6, Sec. II], [31, Eq. (7)], [33, Eq. (7)]:
E
{
1
l
l−1∑
i=0
‖X [i]‖2
}
≤ P, (B.1a)
for all blocklengths l, and specifically, for each n-block of the n-CGMWTC we require
E
{
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
‖X [i]‖2
}
≤ P. (B.1b)
We denote the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to (B.1) with Cn−CGs,TA . The derivation consists of the
following steps:
• First, in Lemma B.1 we show that applying the DFT transforms the n-CGMWTC into a set of independent
parallel MIMO WTCs. We then explain that any achievable rate for the n-CGMWTC can be obtained by
considering only codewords whose length is an integer multiple of n.
• Next, in Lemma B.2 we derive the maximal achievable secrecy rate given a fixed power allocation, when the
blocklength is an integer multiple of n, by a simple extension of the results of [19, Thm. 1]. We conclude that
Cn−CGs,TA can be written as a maximization of the sum of the per-subchannel secrecy capacities over all power
allocations satisfying a specified sum-power constraint.
• Then, in Lemma B.3 we characterize symmetry conditions on the maximal achievable secrecy rate expression
and on the optimal input distribution for the n-CGMWTC, subject to (B.1). This results in an explicit expression
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for Cn−CGs,TA stated in (B.20).
• Lastly, in Corollary B.1 we prove that Cn−CGs = Cn−CGs,TA .
The approach of characterizing the capacity of a channel subject to a per-symbol power constraint by considering a
time-averaged power constraint was also used in [31] for the point-to-point LTI channel (without an eavesdropper).
We begin with some preliminary properties of the multivariate DFT defined in (1). Recall that in (1), each entry
l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nq − 1} of the multivariate DFT {qˆ[k]}n−1k=0 is obtained as the scalar DFT of the l-th entries of
the sequence of vectors {q[i]}n−1i=0 . Consequently, the following properties of the multivariate DFT of real-valued
multivariate sequences can be obtained as straightforward extensions of the corresponding properties of scalar DFTs,
see, e.g., [56, Ch. 8.5-8.6]:
P1 The multivariate DFT defined in (1) is invertible, and the l-th entry of the inverse DFT is obtained as the
scalar inverse DFT of the set of the l-th entries of the sequence of vectors {qˆ[k]}n−1k=0 . Hence, we can write
q[i] =
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
qˆ[k]ej2π
ik
n . (B.2)
P2 Since q[i] is real, then qˆ[k] = (qˆ[n− k])∗ for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. Consequently, {qˆ[k]}n−1k=0 can be obtained
from {qˆ[k]}⌊
n
2 ⌋
k=0 . Note that qˆ[0] is real for any n and that qˆ
[⌊
n
2
⌋]
is real for even n.
P3 Parseval’s relationship for the multivariate DFT is given by
n−1∑
i=0
‖q[i]‖2 = 1
n
n−1∑
k=0
‖qˆ[k]‖2.
P4 The DFT of a multivariate circular convolution is the product of the corresponding DFT sequences: Let
nq1 , nq2 ∈ N, and consider the pair of sequences of length n, p[i] ∈ Rnq1 and R[i] ∈ Rnq2×nq1 , i ∈ N . Let
{pˆ[k]}n−1k=0 be the n-point DFT of {p[i]}n−1i=0 , and define Rˆ[k] ,
n−1∑
i=0
R[i]e−j2π
ik
n , k ∈ N . Consider the sequence
{q[i]}n−1i=0 given by q[i] =
n−1∑
τ=0
R[τ ]p [((i− τ))n]. The n-point DFT of {q[i]}n−1i=0 is given by qˆ[k] = Rˆ[k]pˆ[k],
k ∈ N .
A. Step 1: Transforming the n-CGMWTC into a Set of Independent Parallel MIMO WTCs
Focusing on the n-CGMWTC, consider the input sequence transmitted during one n-block, Xn−1, and the
corresponding channel outputs observed at the intended receiver and at the eavesdropper, denoted
˜
Yn−1 and
˜
Zn−1,
respectively. Recall that by definition of the n-CGMWTC, the outputs are independent of the initial channel state
S0. For τ ∈ N define the zero-padded extensions of the Tx–Rx and of the Tx–Ev channel impulse responses
by
˜
H[τ ] and
˜
G[τ ], respectively, where
˜
H[τ ] = H[τ ] and
˜
G[τ ] = G[τ ] for 0 ≤ τ ≤ m, while
˜
H[τ ] = 0nr×nt and
˜
G[τ ] = 0ne×nt for m < τ < n. Using these definitions, Eqn. (8) can be written as
˜
Y[i] =
n−1∑
τ=0
˜
H[τ ]X [((i− τ))n] + ˜W[i] (B.3a)
˜
Z[i] =
n−1∑
τ=0
˜
G[τ ]X [((i− τ))n] + ˜U[i], (B.3b)
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i ∈ N . Let
{
Xˆ[k]
}n−1
k=0
,
{
˜
Yˆ[k]
}n−1
k=0
, and
{
˜
Zˆ[k]
}n−1
k=0
be the n-point DFTs of
{
X[i]
}n−1
i=0
,
{
˜
Y[i]
}n−1
i=0
, and{
˜
Z[i]
}n−1
i=0
, respectively. Note that Hˆ[k] and Gˆ[k], defined in Section III-B in terms of {H[τ ]}mτ=0 and {G[τ ]}mτ=0,
can be equivalently stated in terms of
{
˜
H[τ ]
}n−1
τ=0
and
{
˜
G[τ ]
}n−1
τ=0
via Hˆ[k] =
n−1∑
τ=0 ˜
H[τ ]e−j2π
τk
n and Gˆ[k] =
n−1∑
τ=0 ˜
G[τ ]e−j2π
τk
n
. Using the sequences
{
˜
Wˆ[k]
}n−1
k=0
and
{
˜
Uˆ[k]
}n−1
k=0
, which correspond to the DFTs of {
˜
W[i]}n−1i=0
and {
˜
U[i]}n−1i=0 , respectively (see Subsection III-B) and property P4 for the DFT of a multivariate circular convo-
lution, we obtain the following relationships:
˜
Yˆ[k] = Hˆ[k]Xˆ[k] +
˜
Wˆ[k] (B.4a)
˜
Zˆ[k] = Gˆ[k]Xˆ[k] +
˜
Uˆ[k], (B.4b)
k ∈ N . Since the DFT is an invertible transformation and the channel outputs are real, it follows that the channel
outputs {
˜
Y[i]}i∈N and {˜Z[i]}i∈N can be obtained from (B.4) for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,
⌊
n
2
⌋} , LCG. Therefore, it is
sufficient to consider
{
˜
Yˆ[k]
}
k∈LCG
and
{
˜
Zˆ[k]
}
k∈LCG
for deriving the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC.
Define next
Pk , E
{∥∥∥Xˆ[k]∥∥∥2} . (B.5)
The average power constraint (B.1) yields a per n-block power constraint
n2P ≥ nE
{
n−1∑
i=0
‖X [i]‖2
}
(a)
= E
{
n−1∑
k=0
∥∥∥Xˆ[k]∥∥∥2
}
=
n−1∑
k=0
Pk, (B.6)
where (a) follows from Parseval’s relationship (property P3). As Xˆ[k] =
(
Xˆ[n− k]
)∗
, it follows that Pn−k = Pk
must hold. In conclusion, when the codeword length is an integer multiple of n, then the secrecy capacity of
the n-CGMWTC (8) subject to the time-averaged power constraint (B.1) is equal to the secrecy capacity of the
memoryless WTC (B.4) subject to the power constraint (B.6).
Finally, as explained in the last paragraph in the proof of Lemma A.7, the capacity of the n-CGMWTC can be
completely characterized by considering only codewords whose length is an integer multiple of n.
Lemma B.1. For k ∈ LCG,
˜
Wˆ[k] and
˜
Uˆ[k] are zero mean Gaussian random vectors statistically independent
over k, i.e., for all k1 6= k2,
˜
Wˆ [k1] and
˜
Wˆ [k2] are independent, and
˜
Uˆ [k1] and
˜
Uˆ [k2] are independent. For
1 ≤ k < n2 , ˜Wˆ[k] and ˜Uˆ[k] are circularly symmetric complex random vectors, and for k = 0, and also for k =
n
2
when n is even,
˜
Wˆ[k] and
˜
Uˆ[k] are zero-mean real Gaussian random vectors. The covariance matrices are given
by
C
˜
Wˆ
[k] , E
{
˜
Wˆ[k]
(
˜
Wˆ[k]
)H}
= n
m∑
τ=−m
CW [τ ] e
−j2π kτ
n (B.7a)
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and
C
˜
Uˆ
[k] , E
{
˜
Uˆ[k]
(
˜
Uˆ[k]
)H}
= n
m∑
τ=−m
CU [τ ] e
−j2π kτ
n . (B.7b)
Furthermore, for each fixed k1,
˜
Wˆ[k1] obtained from different n-blocks are i.i.d., and also
˜
Uˆ[k1] obtained from
different n-blocks are i.i.d. Finally,
˜
Wˆ[k1] and
˜
Uˆ[k2] are mutually independent for any (k1, k2) ∈ LCG × LCG
Proof: The proof follows similar arguments to those used in the proof in [33, Appendix B] for scalar noises.
We first note that since both
˜
Wˆ [k] and
˜
Uˆ [k] are defined as linear combinations of random Gaussian vectors, each
has a zero mean, it follows that
{
˜
Wˆ [k]
}
k∈LCG
are zero-mean, jointly Gaussian, and
{
˜
Uˆ [k]
}
k∈LCG
are zero-mean,
jointly Gaussian. As
˜
W [i1] and
˜
U [i2] are mutually independent for all i1 and i2, it follows that
˜
Wˆ [k1] and
˜
Uˆ [k2]
are mutually independent for all k1, k2. Next, writing explicitly the DFTs we have
E
{
˜
Wˆ [k1]
(
˜
Wˆ [k2]
)H}
= E


(
n−1∑
i1=0
˜
W [i1] e
−j2π
k1i1
n
)(
n−1∑
i2=0
˜
W [i2] e
−j2π
k2i2
n
)H

=
n−1∑
i1=0
n−1∑
i2=0
E
{
˜
W [i1]
˜
WT [i2]
}
e−j2π
k1i1
n ej2π
k2i2
n
(a)
=
n−1∑
i1=0
n−1∑
i2=0
(
1∑
l=−1
CW [i1 − i2 + l · n]
)
e−j2π
k1i1−k2i2
n , (B.8)
where (a) is obtained by plugging the expression for C
˜
W [τ ] from (7a). Note that (B.8) can be written as
n−1∑
i1=0
n−1∑
i2=0
CW [i1−i2] e−j2π
k1i1−k2i2
n +
n−1∑
i1=0
n−1∑
i2=0
CW [i1−i2−n] e−j2π
k1i1−k2i2
n +
n−1∑
i1=0
n−1∑
i2=0
CW [i1−i2+n] e−j2π
k1i1−k2i2
n
(a)
=
n−1∑
i1=0
i1∑
τ=i1−n+1
CW [τ ] e
−j2π
i1(k1−k2)+τk2
n +
n−1∑
i1=0
i1−n∑
τ=i1−2n+1
CW [τ ] e
−j2π
i1(k1−k2)+τk2
n +
n−1∑
i1=0
i1+n∑
τ=i1+1
CW [τ ] e
−j2π
i1(k1−k2)+τk2
n
=
n−1∑
i1=0
i1+n∑
τ=i1−2n+1
CW [τ ] e
−j2π
i1(k1−k2)+τk2
n
(b)
=
n−1∑
i1=0
m∑
τ=−m
CW [τ ] e
−j2π
i1(k1−k2)+τk2
n , (B.9)
where (a) follows from setting τ = i1− i2, τ = i1− i2−n, and τ = i1− i2+n in the first sum, second sum, and
third sum, respectively, and (b) follows since CW [τ ] = 0nr×nr for |τ | > m, and since n > 2m, thus ∀0 ≤ i1 < n,
[−m,m] ⊂ [i1 − 2n+ 1, i1 + n]. It follows that (B.8) yields
E
{
˜
Wˆ [k1]
(
˜
Wˆ [k2]
)H}
=
m∑
τ=−m
CW [τ ]
n−1∑
i1=0
e−j2π
i1(k1−k2)+τk2
n
=
m∑
τ=−m
CW [τ ] e
−j2π
k2τ
n
n−1∑
i1=0
e−j2π
i1(k1−k2)
n .
Let δ[n] denote the Kronecker delta function. Note that since k1, k2 ∈ N , it follows that |k1 − k2| < n, thus for
50
k1 6= k2,
n−1∑
i1=0
e−j2π
i1(k1−k2)
n = 0, while for k1 = k2,
n−1∑
i1=0
e−j2π
i1(k1−k2)
n = n. Therefore,
n−1∑
i1=0
e−j2π
i1(k1−k2)
n =
nδ [k1 − k2] and
E
{
˜
Wˆ [k1]
(
˜
Wˆ [k2]
)H}
= nδ [k1 − k2]
m∑
τ=−m
CW [τ ] e
−j2π
k2τ
n . (B.10)
Note that for k = 0 and for n even then also for k = n2 , ˜
Wˆ[k] and
˜
Uˆ[k] are real-valued, while for 1 ≤ k < n2 ,
˜
Wˆ[k] and
˜
Uˆ[k] are complex-valued. We therefore observe the pseudo-covariance:
E
{
˜
Wˆ[k1]
(
˜
Wˆ[k2]
)T}
= E


(
n−1∑
i1=0
˜
W [i1] e
−j2π
k1i1
n
)(
n−1∑
i2=0
˜
W [i2] e
−j2π
k2i2
n
)T

=
n−1∑
i1=0
n−1∑
i2=0
C
˜
W [i1 − i2] e−j2π
ki1
n e−j2π
ki2
n
(a)
=
n−1∑
i1=0
n−1∑
i2=0
(
l=1∑
l=−1
CW [i1 − i2 + l · n]
)
e−j2π
(k1i1+k2i2)
n , (B.11)
where (a) is obtained by plugging the expression for C
˜
W [τ ] stated in (7a). Repeating the derivation leading to
(B.9) with −k2 instead of k2, we can write (B.11) as
E
{
˜
Wˆ[k1]
(
˜
Wˆ[k2]
)T}
=
m∑
τ=−m
CW [τ ]
n−1∑
i1=0
e−j2π
i1(k1+k2)−τk2
n
=
m∑
τ=−m
CW [τ ] e
j2π
τk2
n
n−1∑
i1=0
e−j2π
i1(k1+k2)
n . (B.12)
Note that if 1 ≤ k1 < n2 or if 1 ≤ k2 < n2 , then 0 < k1 + k2 < n, thus
n−1∑
i1=0
e−j2π
i1(k1+k2)
n = 0. It therefore
follows that the pseudo-covariance is 0nr×nr , except when k1 = k2 = 0 and k1 = k2 = n2 , which corresponds to
real-valued
˜
Wˆ[k1], i.e., the pseudo-covariance matrix is equal to the covariance matrix.
It also follows from (B.10) and (B.12) that for 1 ≤ k < n2 , ˜Wˆ [k] is jointly proper complex [54, Def. 1]. For
k = 0 and, when n is even then also for k = n2 , ˜
Wˆ [k] is real.
Since
{
˜
Wˆ [k]
}
k∈LCG
are jointly Gaussian, it follows from (B.10) and from (B.12) that
{
˜
Wˆ [k]
}
k∈LCG
are
mutually independent. Since for 1 ≤ k < n2 , ˜Wˆ[k] is zero-mean proper complex Gaussian random vector, it
follows that
˜
Wˆ[k] is circularly symmetric [55, Thm. 4]. The fact that for a fixed k1,
˜
Wˆ[k1] obtained from different
n-blocks are i.i.d. follows as
˜
Wˆ[k1] is a function of only {
˜
W[i]}n−1i=0 which are i.i.d. over different n-blocks due
to the n-block memorylessness of the n-CGMWTC. The proof for
˜
Uˆ[k] is similar to the proof for
˜
Wˆ[k]. This
concludes the proof of Lemma B.1.
Since the noises
{
˜
Wˆ [k]
}
k∈LCG
,
{
˜
Uˆ [k]
}
k∈LCG
are mutually independent it follows that the channels (B.4) are
parallel Gaussian channels.
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B. Step 2: The Maximal Achievable Secrecy Rate Cn−CGs,TA
Define for k ∈ LCG
Rkn (Pk) , sup
p(V[k],Xˆ[k]),
E
{‖Xˆ[k]‖2}≤Pk
{
I
(
V[k];
˜
Yˆ[k]
)
− I
(
V[k];
˜
Zˆ[k]
)}
. (B.13)
Note that Rkn (Pk) represents the secrecy capacity of an nt × nr × ne memoryless MIMO WTC with additive
Gaussian noise i.i.d. in time, subject to input power constraint Pk [6, Corollary 1]. Let R′n
(
{Pk}⌊
n
2 ⌋
k=0
)
denote
the maximal achievable secrecy rate for the WTC (B.4) subject to a given a set of per-channel power constraints{
E
{∥∥∥Xˆ[k]∥∥∥2} ≤ Pk
}⌊n2 ⌋
k=0
.
Lemma B.2. When the codeword length is restricted to be an integer multiple of n, R′n
(
{Pk}⌊
n
2 ⌋
k=0
)
satisfies:
R′n
(
{Pk}⌊
n
2 ⌋
k=0
)
=
⌊n2 ⌋∑
k=0
Rkn (Pk) . (B.14)
Proof: From Lemma B.1 we have that the noises at each subchannel k are each i.i.d. over different n-blocks,
and that the noises at subchannel k are independent of the noises at all other subchannels. It thus follows that (B.4)
can be considered as
⌊
n
2
⌋
+1 parallel memoryless MIMO WTCs (e.g., by extending the definition in [19, Sec. 1.3]
for scalar channels to the MIMO case). In [19, Thm. 1] it was shown that the secrecy capacity of independent
memoryless parallel scalar WTCs is given by the sum of the secrecy capacities of each subchannel. Although
differently from [19, Sec. 1.3], which considered the secrecy capacity of parallel scalar WTCs, in the current
analysis we consider the maximization of the achievable secrecy rate of parallel MIMO WTCs subject to a fixed
per-subchannel power allocation, the proof for our case follows identical steps to the proof of [19, Thm. 1], and
thus it is not repeated here.
Note that (B.14) is the maximum achievable secrecy rate for the WTC (B.4) for a given assignment of {Pk}⌊
n
2 ⌋
k=0
when the codeword length is an integer multiple of n; The secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to the
power constraint (B.1) is therefore obtained by finding the assignment of {Pk}⌊
n
2 ⌋
k=0 which maximizes (B.14) subject
to (B.6) while the set {Pk}n−1k=0 is constrained to satisfy Pn−k = Pk for every 1 ≤ k < n2 . As each of the ⌊n2 ⌋
channel uses - one for each subchannel in the set of
⌊
n
2
⌋
parallel subchannels, corresponds to n channel uses of
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the n-CGMWTC, we can summarize the above discussion in the following result
Cn−CGs,TA =
1
n
max
{Pk}
⌊n2 ⌋
k=0 :
n−1∑
k=0
Pk≤n
2P, Pn−k=Pk>0
R′n
(
{Pk}⌊
n
2 ⌋
k=0
)
= max
{Pk}
⌊n2 ⌋
k=0 :
n−1∑
k=0
Pk≤n
2P, Pn−k=Pk>0
1
n
⌊n2 ⌋∑
k=0
Rkn (Pk) . (B.15)
C. Step 3: Deriving an Explicit Expression for the Maximization (B.15)
Define L˜n as L˜n = {0} for n odd and L˜n = {0, n2} for n even. From Lemma B.1, it follows that for 1 ≤ k < n2 ,
the k-th subchannel is a complex memoryless MIMO WTC with circularly symmetric complex normal additive white
Gaussian noise. For the remaining values of k, i.e., for k ∈ L˜n, it follows from Lemma B.1 that the k-th subchannel
is a real memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTC. For a fixed ρ ≥ 0, let Qρ be the set of nt × nt Hermitian positive
semi-definite matrices Q such that Tr (Q) ≤ ρ. We define8 for k ∈ N ,
R˜kn (ρ) , max
Q∈Qρ
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣Inr + Hˆ[k]Q(Hˆ[k])H (C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)−1∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ine + Gˆ[k]Q(Gˆ[k])H (C
˜
Uˆ
[k]
)−1∣∣∣∣
. (B.16)
Lemma B.3. For
⌊
n
2
⌋
< k < n, R˜kn (ρ) = R˜
n−k
n (ρ). When R˜kn (ρ) is obtained with Qopt, then R˜n−kn (ρ) is obtained
with Q∗opt.
Proof: Define
Fkr (Q), Inr+
(
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12
Hˆ[k]Q
(
Hˆ[k]
)H(
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12
,
and
Fke(Q), Ine+
(
C
˜
Uˆ
[k]
)− 12
Gˆ[k]Q
(
Gˆ[k]
)H(
C
˜
Uˆ
[k]
)− 12
.
Since C
˜
Wˆ
[k] and C
˜
Uˆ
[k] are positive-definite Hermitian matrices ∀k ∈ N , it follows from [62, Thm. 7.2.6] that(
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12
and
(
C
˜
Uˆ
[k]
)− 12
are also positive-definite Hermitian matrices. Thus, ∀Q ∈ Qρ, Fkr (Q) and Fke (Q) are
Hermitian matrices.
As H[τ ] and G[τ ] are real matrices, it follows that Hˆ[n − k] =
(
Hˆ[k]
)∗
and Gˆ[n − k] =
(
Gˆ[k]
)∗
. Note that
8Following [6, Eqn. (20)] and [7, Thm. 1], R˜kn(ρ) can be written as a maximization over Qρ, instead of a supremum.
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Inr =
(
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12 (
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12
C
˜
Wˆ
[k], and since (Inr )
∗
= Inr it follows that
Inr =
((
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12 (
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)∗
(a)
=
((
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗((
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗ (
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)∗
(b)
=
((
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗((
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗
C
˜
Wˆ
[n− k] , (B.17)
where (a) follows as for all matrices A1, A2 of compatible dimensions, (A1A2)∗ = A∗1A∗2 [61, Ch. 3.6]; and (b)
follows from (B.7) as C
˜
Wˆ
[n− k] =
(
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)∗
. It follows from (B.17) that
(
C
˜
Wˆ
[n− k]
)− 12
=
((
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗
.
Similarly,
(
C
˜
Uˆ
[n− k]
)− 12
=
((
C
˜
Uˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗
. It therefore follows that
(
F
k
r (Q)
)∗
=
(
Inr+
(
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12
Hˆ[k]Q
(
Hˆ[k]
)H(
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗
(a)
= Inr+
((
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗ (
Hˆ[k]
)∗
Q∗
(
Hˆ[k]
)T((
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗
(b)
= Inr+
(
C
˜
Wˆ
[n− k]
)− 12
Hˆ[n− k]Q∗
(
Hˆ[n− k]
)H(
C
˜
Wˆ
[n− k]
)− 12
= Fn−kr (Q
∗) , (B.18)
where (a) follows from [61, Ch. 3.6], and (b) follows from plugging
(
C
˜
Wˆ
[n− k]
)− 12
=
((
C
˜
Wˆ
[k]
)− 12)∗
and
Hˆ[n− k] =
(
Hˆ[k]
)∗
. Similarly, Fke (Q) =
(
Fn−ke (Q
∗)
)∗
. Therefore
R˜n−kn (ρ)
(a)
= max
Q∈Qρ
1
2
log
∣∣Fn−kr (Q)∣∣∣∣Fn−ke (Q)∣∣
(b)
= max
Q∈Qρ
1
2
log
∣∣Fkr (Q∗)∣∣
|Fke (Q∗)|
(c)
= max
Q∈Qρ
1
2
log
∣∣Fkr (Q)∣∣
|Fke (Q)|
= R˜kn (ρ) ,
where (a) follows from applying Sylvester’s determinant theorem [61, Ch. 6.2] to (B.16); (b) follows since the
determinant of a Hermitian matrix is the same as the determinant of its conjugate [61, Ch. 7.5], thus ∣∣Fn−kr (Q)∣∣ =∣∣∣(Fn−kr (Q))∗∣∣∣ = ∣∣(Fkr (Q∗))∣∣ and ∣∣Fn−ke (Q)∣∣ = ∣∣∣(Fn−ke (Q))∗∣∣∣ = ∣∣(Fke (Q∗))∣∣; (c) follows since the definition
of Qρ implies that if Q ∈ Qρ then also Q∗ ∈ Qρ. Let Qopt , argmax
Q∈Qρ
1
2 log
|Fkr (Q)|
|Fke (Q)|
. Since 12 log
|Fkr (Qopt)|
|Fke (Qopt)|
=
1
2 log
|Fn−kr (Q∗opt)|
|Fn−ke (Q∗opt)| , it follows that Q
∗
opt maximizes 12 log
|Fn−kr (Q)|
|Fn−ke (Q)| . This proves the lemma.
It follows from [6, Thm. 1], [7, Thm. 1], and [8, Corollary 1] that Rkn (Pk) defined in (B.13) is given by
Rkn (Pk) =

2R˜
k
n (Pk) 1 ≤ k < n2
R˜kn (Pk) k ∈ L˜n
, (B.19)
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and that the maximizing channel input for the k-th subchannel, Xˆ[k], is circularly symmetric complex normal for
1 ≤ k < n2 and zero-mean normal for k ∈ L˜n, with the covariance matrix of Xˆ[k], denoted CXˆ [k], satisfying
Tr
(
C
Xˆ
[k]
) ≤ Pk . Let BnP be the set which contains all sets of non-negative scalars {Pk}n−1k=0 such that n−1∑
k=0
Pk ≤
n2P and Pk = Pn−k. Plugging (B.19) into (B.15) yields
Cn−CGs,TA = max
{Pk}
n−1
k=0∈B
n
P
1
n


⌊n2 ⌋∑
k=0
R˜kn (Pk) +
⌊n−12 ⌋∑
k=1
R˜kn (Pk)


= max
{Pk}
n−1
k=0∈B
n
P
1
n


⌊n2 ⌋∑
k=0
R˜kn (Pk) +
n−1∑
k=⌊n2 ⌋+1
R˜kn (Pk)


(a)
= max
{Pk}
n−1
k=0∈B
n
P
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
R˜kn (Pk)
(b)
= max
{CXˆ[k]}n−1k=0∈CˆnP
1
2n
n−1∑
k=0
log ψˆ[k], (B.20)
where (a) follows since for
⌊
n
2
⌋
< k < n we conclude from Lemma B.3 that R˜kn (Pk) = R˜kn (Pn−k) =
R˜n−kn (Pn−k); and (b) follows from plugging the definition of R˜kn (Pk) from (B.16), and from Lemma B.3 combined
with (B.6) which restrict the sets of matrices to CˆnP , and from the definition of ψˆ[k] in (10b). Note that (B.20)
coincides with (10).
D. Step 4: Proving that Cn−CGs = Cn−CGs,TA
So far we have derived Cn−CGs,TA , the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to the time-averaged power
constraint (B.1) when the blocklength is an integer multiple of n. However, we are interested in Cn−CGs , the secrecy
capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to a per-symbol power constraint (3). As the per-symbol constraint (3) is more
restrictive than the time-averaged constraint (B.1), it follows that Cn−CGs ≤ Cn−CGs,TA . In this subsection we prove
that the secrecy capacities are, in fact, equal. Let
{
C
Xˆ,opt [k]
}n−1
k=0
be the set of n matrices which maximize (B.20).
From the derivation of the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to a time-averaged power constraint (B.1)
derived in subsections B-A–B-C, we note the following characteristics of the optimal channel input:
• As X[i] is a real multivariate sequence it follows from the properties of the DFT that for
⌊
n
2
⌋
< k < n, Xˆ[k]
is obtained from Xˆ[k] =
(
Xˆ[n− k]
)∗
.
• From the characteristics of the channel inputs which achieve the secrecy capacity for real-valued memoryless
Gaussian MIMO WTCs [11, Corollary 1]9 it follows that for k ∈ L˜n, Xˆ[k] is a zero-mean real-valued Gaussian
random vecore with covariance matrix C
Xˆ,opt
[k].
• From the characteristics of the channel inputs which achieve the secrecy capacity for complex memoryless
9Note that the real-valued memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTC is a special case of the real-valued memoryless Gaussian MIMO BC with
common and confidential messages studied in [11], when there is no common message and only a single confidential message.
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Gaussian MIMO WTCs with circularly symmetric complex normal noise [6, Thm. 1]10 it follows that for
1 ≤ k < n2 , Xˆ[k] is a circularly symmetric complex normal random vector with covariance matrix CXˆ,opt [k].
• As the subchannels are independent, the optimal input which achieves (B.20) satisfies p
(
Xˆ
⌊n2 ⌋
)
=
⌊n2 ⌋∏
k=0
p
(
Xˆ[k]
)
,
i.e.,
{
Xˆ [k]
}⌊n2 ⌋
k=0
are mutually independent RVs.
The above characteristics give rise to the following corollary:
Corollary B.1. The secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC with a time-averaged power constraint, Cn−CGs,TA , is obtained
with an equal per-symbol power allocation.
Proof: Let Ln− be set of indexes k ∈ N such that k /∈ L˜n. Note that for k ∈ L˜n−, Xˆ[k] =
(
Xˆ[n− k]
)∗
. We
consider the autocorrelation of the time-domain optimal channel input which obtains Cn−CGs,TA . As the time-domain
channel input of the n-CGMWTC is real-valued we can write:
E
{
X [i1]
(
X [i2]
)T}
= E
{
X [i1]
(
X [i2]
)H}
(a)
=
1
n2
n−1∑
k1=0
n−1∑
k2=0
E
{
Xˆ [k1]
(
Xˆ [k2]
)H}
ej2π
i1k1−i2k2
n
(b)
=
1
n2
( n−1∑
k1=0
E
{
Xˆ [k1]
(
Xˆ [k1]
)H}
ej2πk1
i1−i2
n +
∑
k1∈Ln−
E
{
Xˆ [k1]
(
Xˆ [k1]
)T}
ej2πk1
i1+i2
n
)
(c)
=
1
n2
n−1∑
k1=0
E
{
Xˆ [k1]
(
Xˆ [k1]
)H}
ej2πk1
i1−i2
n , (B.21)
where (a) follows by plugging the inverse DFT (B.2); (b) follows since
{
Xˆ [k]
}⌊n2 ⌋
k=0
are zero-mean and mu-
tually independent, thus E
{
Xˆ [k1]
(
Xˆ [k2]
)H} is non zero only when k2 = k1 and when k2 = n − k1, and
since Xˆ[k] =
(
Xˆ[n− k]
)∗
; (c) follows since for k ∈ Ln−, the optimal Xˆ[k] is circularly symmetric complex
normal, thus E
{
Xˆ [k]
(
Xˆ [k]
)T}
= 0nt×nt [54, Sec. III-A.]. It follows from (B.21) that E
{
X [i]
(
X [i]
)T}
=
1
n2
n−1∑
k1=0
E
{
Xˆ [k1]
(
Xˆ [k1]
)H}
, thus, the covariance matrix of the time-domain optimal channel input X[i] which
achieves Cn−CGs,TA is independent of the time index i, i ∈ N . As the power constraint is the same for all n-blocks,
we conclude that Cn−CGs,TA is obtained with an equal per-symbol power allocation, namely satisfies (3) with equality.
Since Cn−CGs ≤ Cn−CGs,TA , then Corollary B.1 implies that Cn−CGs = Cn−CGs,TA . Combining this with (B.20),
and noting that it is enough to consider blocklengths which are integer multiples of n to characterize the secrecy
capacity of the n-CGMWTC, proves that Cn−CGs is obtained by (10).
10 Note that [6] showed that circularly symmetric complex normal inputs are optimal for complex memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTCs with
additive circularly-symmetric complex normal (ACSCN) noise, subject to the more general time-averaged power constraint, which subsumes
the per-symbol power constraint. It directly follows from [6] and [63, Lemma 1] that the optimal codebook which achieves the secrecy capacity
in [6] also satisfies the per-symbol power constraint. Thus, we conclude that circularly symmetric complex normal inputs are also optimal for
complex memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTCs with ACSCN noise subject to the per-symbol power constraint.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
We now show that in the limit of n→∞, Cn−CGs stated in (10c) coincides with (6c). Following the approach
of [33, Sec. V], this is done by showing that Cn−CGs can be written as averaging over n uniformly distributed
samples of a Riemann integrable function, thus in the limit of n→∞, Cn−CGs can be written as an integral [43,
Def. 6.2]. For k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, let ωk = 2πkn . By definition, Hˆ[k] = H′ (ωk) and Gˆ[k] = G′ (ωk). From (B.7) it
follows that C
˜
Wˆ
[k] = nC′
W
(ωk) and C
˜
Uˆ
[k] = nC′
U
(ωk). For a fixed n > 2m, by setting C′X(ωk) = 1nCXˆ [k], we
can write Cn−CGs of (10c) as
Cn−CGs = max{C′X(ωk)}n−1k=0∈CˆnPn
1
2n
n−1∑
k=0
log
∣∣∣Inr + H′ (ωk)C′X(ωk) (H′ (ωk))H (C′W(ωk))−1∣∣∣∣∣∣Ine + G′ (ωk)C′X(ωk) (G′ (ωk))H (C′U(ωk))−1∣∣∣ . (C.1)
Define f(ω) , 12 log
∣∣∣Inr+H′(ω)C′X(ω)(H(ω))H(C′W(ω))−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ine+G′(ω)C′X(ω)(G(ω))H(C′U(ω))
−1
∣∣∣
. Eq. (C.1) can be written as
Cn−CGs = max{C′X(ωk)}n−1k=0∈CˆnPn
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
f (ωk) . (C.2)
Next, we show that f(ω) is Riemann integrable. From [43, Thm. 11.33], if a function is bounded and continuous al-
most everywhere on [0, 2π), then it is Riemann integrable. Define fN(ω) , log
∣∣∣Inr+H′ (ω)C′X(ω) (H′ (ω))H (C′W(ω))−1∣∣∣
and fD(ω) , log
∣∣∣Ine+G′ (ω)C′X(ω) (G′ (ω))H (C′U(ω))−1∣∣∣. From [52, Thm. 17.9.7] it follows that both fN (ω)
and fD(ω) are non-negative. Following [33, Eqns. (29)-(31)], we assume that the entries of C′X(ω) are Riemann
integrable functions over [0, 2π). From the definition in Thm. 1, the entries of the matrices H′ (ω), G′ (ω), C′
W
(ω),
and C′
U
(ω) are each a finite linear combination of exponential functions, and are therefore continuous with respect
to ω, with a finite number of finite magnitude extremums in any given finite interval. Thus, from [43, Thm. 11.33]
we conclude that the entries of H′ (ω), G′ (ω), C′
W
(ω), and C′
U
(ω) are all Riemann integrable. From Cramer’s rule
[62, Ch. 0.8] and since the determinant of a matrix is obtained as a sum of products of its elements [61, Ch. 6.1], it
follows that each entry in the inverse matrix is obtained as a finite sum of products of entries of the original matrix.
From [43, Thm. 6.12, Thm. 6.13] we obtain that sum and products of Riemann integrable functions are Riemann
integrable. Hence, when the entries of a matrix are Riemann integrable functions, so are the entries of its inverse, and
therefore, the elements of (C′
W
(ω))
−1
and (C′
U
(ω))
−1
are also Riemann integrable functions. It this follows that the
entries of Inr + H′ (ω)C′X(ω) (H (ω))
H (C′
W
(ω))−1 and of Ine + G′ (ω)C′X(ω) (G (ω))
H (C′
U
(ω))−1 are Riemann
integrable. Consequently, as log (·) is continuous over the set of positive real numbers, it follows from [43, Thm.
6.11, Thm. 6.12, Thm. 6.13] that fN(ω) and fD(ω) are Riemann integrable functions on [0, 2π). Since the sum
of Riemann integrable functions is also Riemann integrable [43, Thm. 6.12], it follows that f(ω) is also Riemann
integrable. Thus, setting ∆ω(n) = 2π
n
yields lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
f (ωk) = lim
n→∞
1
2π
n−1∑
k=0
f (ωk)∆ω
(n) = 12π
2π∫
0
f (ω)dω.
Note that as we set C′
X
(ωk) to be 1nCXˆ [k] we have C
′
X
(ωk) = C
′
X
(ωn−k)
∗
, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}. Therefore,
in the limiting case of n → ∞ it follows that C′
X
(ω) = C′
X
(2π − ω)∗. From the definitions in Thm. 1, it follows
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that also H′ (ω) = H′ (2π − ω)∗, G′ (ω) = G′ (2π − ω)∗, C′
W
(ω) = C′
W
(2π − ω)∗, and C′
U
(ω) = C′
U
(2π − ω)∗,
therefore f(ω) = f(2π − ω), i.e.,
2π∫
0
f (ω)dω = 2
π∫
0
f (ω)dω.
Using similar arguments, we now show that the power constraint in the limit of n→∞ implies that C′
X
(ω) ∈ CP .
Define t(ω) , Tr (C′
X
(ω)) and note that as C′
X
(ω) = C′
X
(2π − ω)∗, it follows that t(ω) = t(2π − ω). As the
elements of C′
X
(ω) are Riemann integrable, it follows that t(ω) is also Riemann integrable, thus
lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
Tr (C′X(ωk)) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
t (ωk)
=
1
2π
2π∫
ω=0
t (ω)dω
(a)
=
1
π
π∫
ω=0
Tr (C′
X
(ω)) dω. (C.3)
where (a) follows as t(ω) = t(2π − ω). It follows from (C.3) that if {C′
X
(ωk)}n−1k=0 ∈ Cˆ
n
P
n
, then, in the limit of
n → ∞, C′
X
(ω) ∈ CP . Thus, by letting n → ∞ in (C.2), it follows that lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs is given by (6c). Since it
was shown in Proposition 1 that Cs = lim
n→∞
Cn−CGs , the proposition follows.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
In order to prove Proposition 4, we first show that if (11) is satisfied, then the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC,
Cs, is strictly positive; then, we prove that if Cs is strictly positive, it follows that (11) must be satisfied. The
proof follows a similar outline to that of [6, Corollary 2]. Before we begin, we note that defining H′w(ω) =
(C′
W
(ω))
− 12 H′ (ω) and G′w(ω) = (C′U(ω))
− 12 G′ (ω), and applying Sylvester’s determinant theorem [61, Ch. 6.2],
(6c) can be written as
Cs= max
C′
X
(ω)∈CP
1
2π
π∫
ω=0
log
∣∣∣Inr+H′w(ω)C′X(ω) (H′w(ω))H ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ine+G′w(ω)C′X(ω) (G′w(ω))H ∣∣∣ dω. (D.1)
Assume that (11) is satisfied, then, ∀ω ∈ Ω, there exists a vector v (ω) such that
‖G′w(ω)v (ω)‖ < ‖H′w(ω)v (ω)‖ . (D.2)
Note that if v (ω) satisfies (D.2) then v(ω)‖v(ω)‖ also satisfies (D.2), hence we can consider only vectors v (ω) such
that ‖v (ω)‖ = 1. Now, let |Ω| denote the Lebesgue measure of Ω and set C′
X
(ω) = 0nt×nt for ω /∈ Ω and
C′
X
(ω) = π·P|Ω| v (ω) (v (ω))
H for ω ∈ Ω. Note that C′
X
(ω) is a positive-definite Hermitian matrix which satisfies
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(6a), hence C′
X
(ω) ∈ CP . It follows that
Cs
(a)
≥ 1
2π
∫
ω∈Ω
log
∣∣∣Inr+ π·P|Ω| H′w(ω)v(ω)(v(ω))H(H′w(ω))H ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ine+ π·P|Ω| G′w(ω)v(ω)(v(ω))H(G′w(ω))H
∣∣∣ dω
(b)
=
1
2π
∫
ω∈Ω
(
log
(
1 +
π · P
|Ω| · ‖H
′
w(ω)v (ω)‖2
)
− log
(
1 +
π · P
|Ω| · ‖G
′
w(ω)v (ω)‖2
))
dω, (D.3)
where (a) follows from plugging C′
X
(ω) defined above into (D.1), and (b) follows from Sylvester’s determinant
theorem [61, Ch. 6.2]. Note that ∀ω ∈ Ω, log
(
1 + π·P|Ω| · ‖H′w(ω)v (ω)‖2
)
> log
(
1 + π·P|Ω| · ‖G′w(ω)v (ω)‖2
)
. As
the Lebesgue measure of Ω is non-zero, it follows that (D.3) is strictly positive, thus Cs is strictly positive, i.e.,
(11) is a sufficient condition for a strictly positive secrecy capacity.
Next, we show that if (11) is not satisfied, then Cs = 0. Let C′X,opt (ω) ∈ CP be the maximizing covariance
matrix for (D.1). Thus, we have
Cs=
1
2π
π∫
ω=0
log
∣∣∣Inr+H′w(ω)C′X,opt (ω) (H′w(ω))H ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ine+G′w(ω)C′X,opt (ω) (G′w(ω))H ∣∣∣ dω. (D.4)
Since C′
X,opt (ω) ∈ CP , it follows that ∀ω ∈ [0, π), C′X,opt (ω) is a positive semi-definite Hermitian matrix, thus,
from [61, Ch. 7.5-7.6] it can be written as C′
X,opt (ω) = L (ω) (L (ω))
H
. Plugging this decomposition into (D.4) we
write
Cs =
1
2π
π∫
ω=0
log
∣∣∣Inr + H′w(ω) L (ω) (L (ω))H(H′w(ω))H ∣∣∣∣∣∣Ine + G′w(ω)L (ω) (L (ω))H(G′w(ω))H ∣∣∣ dω
(a)
=
1
2π
π∫
ω=0
log
∣∣∣Int + (L (ω))H(H′w(ω))HH′w(ω)L (ω)∣∣∣∣∣∣Int + (L (ω))H(G′w(ω))HG′w(ω) L (ω)∣∣∣ dω, (D.5)
where (a) follows from Sylvester’s determinant theorem [61, Ch. 6.2]. Now, define
B (ω) , (L (ω))
H
(G′w(ω))
H
G′w(ω) L (ω)− (L (ω))H(H′w(ω))HH′w(ω) L (ω) .
B (ω) is clearly Hermitian. If (11) is not satisfied, then for all ω ∈ [0, π), possibly except for a zero-measure subset
of [0, π), B (ω) is positive semi-definite, since ∀a ∈ Cnt
aHB (ω)a = ‖G′w(ω) L (ω)a‖2 − ‖H′w(ω) L (ω)a‖2
(a)
= ‖G′w(ω) a˜‖2 − ‖H′w(ω) a˜‖2
(b)
≥ 0,
where (a) follows by setting a˜ , L (ω)a, and (b) follows since
‖H′w(ω) a˜‖
‖G′w(ω) a˜‖
≤ sup
v∈Cnt
‖H′w(ω)v‖
‖G′w(ω)v‖
≤ 1.
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Let λG,k(ω) and λH,k(ω) be the k-th largest eigenvalue of (L (ω))H(G′w(ω))
H
G′w(ω) L (ω) and the k-th largest
eigenvalue of (L (ω))H(H′w(ω))
H
H′w(ω) L (ω), respectively, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nt}. As B (ω) is a positive semi-definite
Hermitian matrix, it follows from the min-max theorem [61, Ch. 7.5] [62, Ch. 7.7] that ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nt},
λG,k(ω) ≥ λH,k(ω) ≥ 0, (D.6)
where the non-negativity of the eigenvalues λG,k(ω) and λH,k(ω) follows since (L (ω))H(G′w(ω))
H
G′w(ω) L (ω)
and (L (ω))H(H′w(ω))
H
H′w(ω) L (ω) are positive semi-definite. Therefore, for all ω ∈ [0, π), except for maybe a
zero-measure subset of [0, π), it follows that
∣∣∣Int + (L (ω))H(G′w(ω))HG′w(ω) L (ω)∣∣∣ (a)=
nt∏
k=1
(1 + λG,k(ω))
(b)
≥
nt∏
k=1
(1 + λH,k(ω))
(c)
=
∣∣∣Int + (L (ω))H(H′w(ω))HH′w(ω)L (ω)∣∣∣ , (D.7)
where (a) and (c) follow from [61, Ch. 7.5] since (L (ω))H(G′w(ω))HG′w(ω)L (ω) and (L (ω))H(H′w(ω))HH′w(ω) L (ω)
are Hermitian; (b) follows from (D.6). Applying the relationship (D.7) to (D.5) yields Cs ≤ 0, therefore (11) is a
necessary condition for a strictly positive secrecy capacity. This completes our proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
We first consider only blocklengths which are an integer multiple of nPLC. Define the nPLC × 1 multivariate
processes XPLC
[˜
i
]
, YPLC
[˜
i
]
, and ZPLC
[˜
i
]
, using the following assignments:
(
XPLC
[
i˜
])
k
= X
[
i˜ · nPLC + k
]
,(
YPLC
[
i˜
])
k
= YPLC
[
i˜ · nPLC + k
]
, and
(
ZPLC
[
i˜
])
k
= ZPLC
[
i˜ · nPLC + k
]
, respectively, k ∈ NPLC. It
follows from (13b) that
E
{∥∥XPLC [ i˜ ]∥∥2} = nPLC−1∑
k=0
E
{∣∣X [ i˜ · nPLC + k]∣∣2}
≤ P · nPLC, (E.1)
thus, XPLC
[
i˜
]
is subject to a per-symbol power constraint P · nPLC. From [51, Appendix B], it follows that the
scalar NB-PLC WTC (12) can be transformed into the following equivalent MIMO Gaussian channel with finite
memory m = 1:
YPLC
[
i˜
]
=
1∑
τ˜=0
HPLC [ τ˜ ]XPLC
[
i˜− τ˜ ]+WPLC [ i˜ ] (E.2a)
ZPLC
[
i˜
]
=
1∑
τ˜=0
GPLC [ τ˜ ]XPLC
[
i˜− τ˜ ]+UPLC [ i˜ ] , (E.2b)
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where the transformation is bijective as we consider only codes with blocklength which is an integer multiple
of nPLC. It follows from Thm. 1 that the secrecy capacity of the equivalent MIMO WTC (E.2) is given by
nPLC · Cs,PLC , where Cs,PLC is given by (15b), subject to (15a). Since each channel input in the equivalent
MIMO channel corresponds to nPLC channel inputs in the original NB-PLC WTC, the corollary follows for codes
whose blocklength which is an integer multiple of nPLC. Lastly, we note that as nPLC is fixed and finite, then any
achievable secrecy rate can be achieved using codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of nPLC, where the
proof is similar to that of Proposition A.1 and of Lemma A.7.
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